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Abstract
This work is an investigation of the influence of academic philosophy on non-academics in the 
Early Modern period (the 16th and 17th centuries).  The first chapter will use Craig’s Similarity 
Thesis to examine Early Modern philosophy in general, Philosophy of Science and Theology and 
how they interacted to elevate human reason to the level of divine certainty.  The second chapter 
will draw on Dear’s description of the changing status of mathematics in academia in the Early 
Modern period.  This second chapter will draw the importance and divine relevance of rationality 
as developed in the first chapter into the discussion to further explore the relationships between 
science, metaphysics, mathematics and the divine.  The third and final chapter will examine one 
particular instance of the influence of these ideas on popular thought, specifically in Girard 
Thibault’s early 17th century treatise instructing the reader in swordsmanship, who uses the view 
of mathematics and the rational mind that is discussed in the preceding chapters to inform his 
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Introduction
 “…there is no reason in principle why the ‘dominant philosophy’ of an 
epoch should not be carried by persons who do not count as philosophers 
at all in contemporary and recent university practice.” (Craig, 1996)
In this dissertation, I take to heart Craig’s thought that there is much outside the academy of 
professional interest to philosophers, and that observation of praxes of non-academics may 
give  insight  into  the  philosophical  theories  that  inform  those  praxes.   Penetration  of 
identifiable ideas from academic philosophy into specific non-academic praxes may also be 
used  as  samples  of  popular  acceptance  of  those  ideas.  This  work  will  move  from the 
cerebral  practices typically  associated  with  the  “contemporary  and  recent  university 
practice”  of  philosophy  to  the  more  physical  martial  arts;  specifically  to  the  rhetoric, 
theoretical  principles  and pedagogical  practice  of  one particular  martial  art,  arguing that 
activities previously neglected  by historians of philosophy may offer insight into popular 
appropriation of academic philosophy.  That martial art being the Spanish-origin sword art 
typically referred to as “La Verdadera Destreza”, the True High Art.  
La Destreza originated in Spain in the mid 16th century.  The founding text was written in 
1569 by Don Jeronimo Sanchez de Carança (or Carranza), though not published until 1582, 
entitled The book of Jeronimo de Carança, native of Seville.  A treatise on the philosophy of 
weapons and the art of Christian attack and defence.1  Carança was the sometime governor 
1 Libro de Hieronimo de Carança, natvral de Sevilla, que trata de la philosophia de las armas y de su 
destreza y de la aggression y defension Christiana
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of the Honduras and of Sanlúcar de Barremeda and well respected in Spain for his learning, 
skill and sense of honour.  For as Cervantes wrote in the Galatea,
If you would see an equal balance
Of blonde Phoebe and red Mars
Contrive to gaze upon the great Carranza
In whom the one and the other are not parted
You see in him, friends, the pen and the lance
With such discretion, skill and art
That the arts of fencing, in its parts
He has reduced to science and to art2
The next major figure in the tradition is Don Luys (or Luis) Pacheco de Narvaez, a prolific 
writer (author of more than 15 books on swordsmanship during the early to mid 17th century) 
who began has career with a commentary on Carança, and became Master of Arms to King 
Philip IV in 1624.  These men founded a broad tradition that would have influence well into 
the 18th century in Spain (which had an unusually conservative fencing tradition (Anglo, 
2002)).   The most  famous member  of  this  tradition,  in the English speaking world,  was 
Girard Thibault, a Flemish born Fencing master who produced what is likely the most lavish 
2 "Si queréis ver en una igual balanza
al rubio Febo y colorado Marte,
procurad de mirar al gran Carranza,
de quien el uno y otro no se parte.
En él veréis, amigas, pluma y lanza
con tanta discreción, destreza y arte,
que la destreza, en partes dividida,
la tiene a sciencia y arte reducida."
Cervantes (1585)
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of all books ever written on the subject; his The school of the sword of Girard Thibault of  
Antwerp in which he demonstrates by mathematical rules founded on an esoteric circle the  
theory and practice of the true and presently hidden secrets of the use of weapons on foot  
and on horseback,3 published by Elzevier4 in 1628.  It is this text that will form the basis of 
this dissertation as the Spanish language texts are insufficiently accessible, both physically 
and linguistically, to me.  This will limit my ability to make broad claims about the tradition 
as a whole, requiring more research to be done in this area in the future.
These Spanish  fencing  writers  and  their  successors were  in  touch  with  the  shifting 
intellectual  currents of  the 16th and 17th centuries and used their  knowledge of changing 
understanding of science, art, nature and man to inform the theoretical foundations of  the 
content of their teachings and possibly their pedagogical practice as well. The precise details 
of the pedagogy followed are nowhere described for this tradition and so cannot be precisely 
described  (until  and unless such descriptions are discovered) and what inferences can be 
drawn are beyond the scope of this work, but the content of what was taught is thoroughly 
detailed.  Two major currents in philosophy will inform the first two chapters of this work 
and Thibault’s work will be be examined in their light; the first  current containing ideas 
about  the  relationship  between  man  and  God  and  the  second  concerning  the  place  of 
mathematics within the sciences (and of the nature of science itself).  The fencing writers 
were influenced by these currents as well as by classical  Greek philosophy, the content of 
3 Academie de l’Espée de Girard Thibault d’Anvers  ou se demonstrent par Reigles mathematiques  
sur le fondement d’un Cercle mysterieux la Theorie et Pratique des vrais et jusqu’a present incognus 
secrets du Maniement des Armes a Pied et a Cheval
4 Not the present company but the dominant academic publisher of the 17th century, from which the 
current publisher drew the inspiration for its name.  
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which influences will be the core in this study.
My first chapter will explore the ideas current in the early 17th century about the natures of 
the human and the divine.  I will largely be using the theories expressed by Craig in his 1996 
work  The Mind of  God and the Works  of  Man (from which the epigraph comes).   This 
relationship, influenced by the doctrine of causal similarity, would influence both academic 
and  popular  thought,  specifically  in  contemporary  notions  of  the  ability  of  humanity  to 
apprehend the  divine and approach Truth and the  place of  science in  those overlapping 
projects.  The doctrine of causal similarity, an important one in science at the time, held that 
effects derived all properties from their causes and that this inheritance would occur in an 
intelligible fashion.  This meant that human nature shared its essential characteristics with 
the nature of the divine (with emphasis on rationality as the dimension of similarity)  and 
similarly  that  the  nature  of  creation  reflected the  nature  of  the  creator  in  an  intelligible 
fashion.   Investigation  of  the  world  thus  became  seen  by  some  philosophers  as  being 
investigation of the divine as well.  
The second chapter uses as its core Dear’s 1995 analysis of the changing nature of science in 
the Early Modern period and how those changes accommodated the conceptual linking of the 
searches  for  metaphysical,  physical  and  pragmatic  or  artisanal  truths.   Central  to  my 
examination of this process will be the relationship between mathematics and the physical 
sciences.  I  will then draw upon the conclusions of the first  chapter to examine how the 
importance of rationality influenced this development in the sciences and how the growing 
importance of mathematics, as part of this process, influenced thinking about the search for 
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divine truths and the status of metaphysical truth in non-academic pursuits.
My third and final chapter will closely examine the first chapter of Thibault’s work in which 
the  foundations  of  the  system  he  taught  are  laid  out  in  light  of  the  Early  Modern5 
philosophies appropriated by Thibault (and other fencing teachers, though he is one of the 
clearest examples and so is suited for an initial investigation such as this).  I will show that 
there is significant influence of the academic thinking described in the previous two chapters 
on Thibault’s  fencing theory and on how he communicated that  theory.   This  influence 
serves as an example of the flow of ideas from the academy into public life in the Early 
Modern Period and as  an example  of  formal  philosophical  content  in  a field  previously 
unexamined for such content.  Following this chapter will be my translation of the majority 
of Thibault’s first chapter as an appendix and a further appendix on the history of fencing 
teaching.
5 Early Modern is a term I use, in line with other writers to describe the period 16th and 17th centuries, 
essentially from the Lutheran Reformation to the beginning of the industrial era in Europe.  It is a term 
that overlaps partly with the so-called renaissance but includes the period of the rising nation-state and 
growing eminence of science while excluding the developments of 14th and 15th century Italy
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Chapter 1:  Knowing God
The fencing masters of the Destreza tradition believed that their discipline, success in other 
endeavours, theological correctness and scientific knowledge were united by being different 
expressions of true knowledge of the world and that the sacred and the profane worlds were 
united by being governed by the same rules.  That knowledge of these rules was achievable, and 
how such knowledge could be acquired and believed will be examined in this, and the next, 
chapter before I move on to examining how the fencing masters appropriated and interpreted 
these philosophical themes in their own writing.  This first chapter examines one of the major 
themes in Early Modern thought that influenced the philosophy of fencing in the “Destreza” 
tradition.  This is the set of concepts that Craig (1987) calls the Similarity Thesis: the idea that 
man was made “in the image of God” and the various philosophical attempts to explain what that 
statement amounted to.  
While it was long an article of faith in Judaism (the idea being referred to as bi-demūt Elohim or 
be-zelem Elohim1) (Altmann 1968) and its descendants (importantly Christianity2 for this work), 




Thus be-zelem Elohim translates directly as “In the image of God” while bi-demut Elohim takes a 
more equivocal position as “in similitude of God”.  Altmann (1968) discusses the nature of and reasons for 
that equivocation.
2  The following are a set of biblical quotes demonstrating the importance of the idea in Christian 
thought.
 “And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness:” Genesis 1:26 (Authorised 
Version)
  “So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female 
created he them.” Genesis 1:27 (AV)
   “Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made he 
man” Genesis 9:6 (AV)
“For a man indeed ought not to cover his head, forasmuch as he is the image and glory of God: but 
the woman is the glory of the man” 1 Corinthians 11:7 (AV)
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investigate their understanding of this similarity and explain the characteristics that most 
embodied the similarity and its extent.  After examining the Early Modern incarnations of the 
idea, earlier versions of the models of similarity of importance to fencing are examined.
1.1 The Idea of Similarity
In order to better one’s understanding of the meaning of any comparison, one must have clear 
ideas about both objects of the comparison as well as the quality, or qualities, of similarity and 
how that quality is shared between the objects.  Early Modern philosophy was heir to a long 
tradition of thought about the nature of God and this tradition provided many of the ideas that 
philosophers would use and modify in their definitions of God as one object in the comparison 
of human and divine.  Likewise the nature of humanity has been deeply thought about through 
the entire history of the discipline of philosophy.  It was these sets of ideas between which points 
of similarity and difference were sought, and within which such comparisons would lead to 
further change in each idea.
Craig (1987) identifies two major variants on the Thesis; that of similarity in will and that of 
similarity in reason and one minor version; similarity in agency.  Those arguing for similarity in 
agency, such as Leibniz, claimed that the divine ability to cause change in the world was 
paralleled by some property of humanity such as the ability to mentally create sub-worlds 
through imagination and dreams.  Those arguing for similarity in the will claimed that the 
“But we all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same 
image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord. 2 Corinthians 3:18 (AV)
The above extracts indicate that special similarity that humanity and deity have in terms of 
creation, but the following two are, in the context of Christianity, even more important.  They describe 
how the incarnation (the defining even of Christianity) was made possible by this close similarity between 
human and God and further, how the similarity made the incarnation meaningful.
“For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that 
he might be the firstborn among many brethren” Romans 8:29 (AV)
“In whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of 
the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them” 2 Corinthians 4:4 
(AV)
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human will is unbounded, being capable of freely making any choice, and is the part of the mind 
that most closely resembles that of God.  For Craig this argument, while more popular than that 
of similarity of action, was not the dominant one in the 16th and 17th centuries, becoming very 
important in the 19th century.  The dimension of similarity  Craig offers as the dominant one in 
those centuries is that of reason or understanding.  If that was the case, then what sort of human 
understanding was considered similar to the understanding of God, in what respect was it seen as 
similar and why did Early Modern philosophers interpret the relationship in the way that they 
individually did?
 
1.2 Causal Similarity in Descartes and Some of his Contemporaries
To summarise the argument central to most versions of the Similarity Thesis, both man and 
nature were thought to be creations of a singular deity with very specific properties and they 
inherited the properties they had from this creative deity.  For example, within the particular 
Scholastic concept of causation that Descartes uses in the Meditations, an effect only has 
properties that it receives from its cause and nothing can cause anything that does not resemble 
it.  The model of causation that these Early Modern philosophers were using was taken from 
Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics.  Aristotle presents the reader with four types of cause, the 
material, efficient, formal and final.  The material was that from which the effect is made, the 
formal was that which it is to be, the efficient was the source of the change and the final was its 
purpose.  These being defined, any or all of them may be used in the explanation of an instance 
of causation (Falcon 2006).  
This is an idea that, according to Buchdahl (1969), is critical for Descartes’ demonstration of 
God’s existence.  This statement of the principle may seem lacking in detail (for example, details 
of how such inheritance occurs) but a sustained reading of Descartes and his commentators does 
fill in some of the gaps.  Gassendi for example criticises Descartes here for applying this 
principle to all causes and effects where it should, he felt, only have been applied to material 
causes and certainly not to efficient causes (Descartes 1955. p159, Clatterbaugh 1980. p 380). 
Descartes however ascribed to Gassendi the common and easy confusion of the proximal 
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efficient cause and the total efficient cause, the only example of which he gives is God 
(Descartes 1970).  Clatterbaugh (1980) suggests that there are other examples of efficient causes 
(causes of motion in the cases he mentions) in Descartes’ works that, by virtue of being 
sufficient to cause a change in the motion of a body and of being similar to the effect, are 
equivalent to total efficient causes.  These are necessary attributes of a total efficient cause and 
in interpreting Descartes and his contemporaries; we may treat causes of that type as behaving 
like total efficient causes.   However it is not clear that they, in all cases, exhibit all necessary 
characteristics of total efficient causes.3  Indeed it is not clearly expressed in any of Descartes' 
writings that any total efficient causes other than God truly exist, especially if we are to take the 
word total literally, as meaning “responsible for all characteristics of the effect”.  
A question that must still be answered for the purposes of this work is, what type of cause was 
God seen as being?  There seem to be elements of more than one type of causation in the model 
Descartes uses and this provides us with some of the required answers to Gassendi’s criticism.  It 
does not seem that God can serve solely as an efficient cause to either the universe or humanity. 
If God serves as an efficient cause, then what is the material cause?  The material cause of the 
universe can only be God  and while things in the universe may have proximal material causes 
that are other created things, the chain of material causation must go back to the first cause, 
which in the world view under discussion was held to be God.  The formal cause and the final 
causes are likewise God (or at least God’s plan for creation).  Descartes is dissatisfied with the 
use of the final cause in scientific explanations (Ariew 1992), in this he comes close to 
Aristotle’s treatment of final and formal causes as equivalent in most studies of natural processes 
(Falcon 2006), but other philosophers, particularly the Jesuits and other Scholastics who 
emphasised natural philosophy as a theological pursuit (Osler 1997), contemporary with 
Descartes were not so inclined. For Early Modern Christian philosophers, the efficient cause of 
the universe can only be God.  It may be that the union of all types of cause in the idea of the 
deity is the cause of some of the disagreement between Gassendi and Descartes.
3 Clatterbaugh does not, for example distinguish between total (sum of all efficient causes of all properties 
of an effect) and ultimate (first cause in a causal chain) efficient causes.  
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For Gassendi, the problem at the root of their disagreement is that inheritance through material 
causation is being confused with the mechanisms of efficient causation.  For Descartes, the 
problem is that proximal efficient causes are being mistaken for total efficient causes.  This latter 
problem is one that is avoidable in cases that include God as the first cause since, in the 
worldview where this condition is met, God is always the total efficient cause, as discussed 
above.  Gassendi’s criticism is a more telling criticism in this case.  For the purposes of this 
work it does not, however, strike a fatal blow to this application of the causal similarity principle 
since God is as much material cause, being responsible for all the qualities of material substance, 
as efficient cause.  It does however require some consideration as it has reference to the general 
principles of the model of causation under discussion.  
In considering the problem we must first examine what is understood by inheritance. 
Clatterbaugh (1980) identifies three modes of inheritance, formal, objective and eminent. 
According to him
..when a reality which exists formally or objectively in an effect, exists 
formally or eminently in the total efficient cause of that effect, Descartes’ 
similarity condition, the causal likeness principle, is satisfied. (p. 384)
Clatterbaugh goes on to express different sets of conditions of satisfaction of the principle for 
inheriting different types of reality (or different properties), all of which are rules for 
determining satisfaction of the condition after causation (and inheritance) have already occurred 
and which are based on the presence of the reality of interest in the total efficient cause and in 
the effect.  This principle can of course be expanded, though Clatterbaugh does not do so, to 
include other types of cause for a more complete statement of the test for satisfaction of the 
causal likeness principle.  The major weakness in the approach taken by Clatterbaugh is his 
interpretation of the principle of eminent inheritance; that being the mode of causal inheritance 
where the effect exhibits a property not apparent in the cause.  Descartes works around this 
potential weakness in the principle of causal inheritance by positing a mode of inheritance in 
which a property in an effect can be inherited from another property in the cause that is the 
“higher exact counterpart” of the former.  
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In focusing on the place of the causal likeness principle in Cartesian mechanics, he used the case 
of transfer of heat and motion from one extended substance to another as his paradigm cases. 
According to him, this is Descartes’ major project and his major use of the causal likeness 
principle but in focusing so strongly on it, Clatterbaugh makes nothing of the importance of the 
causal likeness principle in Descartes’ metaphysical and religious project.  Part of the weakness 
(for the purposes of my work) may have to do with the interpretation of eminent inheritance that 
he uses.  This interpretation is one that uses qualities that can be quantified and exist in different 
magnitudes, but are of the same kind, in both cause and effect.  So, for example, 
…consider a case in which two hard bodies of equal size collide when one is 
at rest and the other moving; the moving body will transfer some, but not all 
of its quantity of motion to the body at rest…This kind of case, where the 
cause and the effect have the same kind of reality but the cause has it to a 
greater extent than the effect, seems to be a paradigm of a cause containing a 
“higher exact counterpart” to the reality produced in the effect. (Clatterbaugh, 
1980, p. 380)
This interpretation of eminent inheritance works very well within Cartesian mechanics but does 
not go beyond it, neglecting the place of Cartesian mechanics within the broader Cartesian 
project.  The limitations are primarily that it only applies to quantifiable qualities and that it only 
applies to inheritance situations where the quality held by the effect is recognisably (to the 
human observer and interpreter) the same as that held by the cause.  The apparent corollary to 
this definition of eminent inheritance is that inheritance of formal or objective realities can 
therefore only be interpreted as involving either the complete transfer of a reality from a cause to 
an effect (as is the case for a material cause) or the imparting of the reality into the effect without 
the cause suffering any loss of it.  
For these cases to be considered paradigmatic, it would mean that eminent inheritance would be 
the type of inheritance with most clear apparent identity between the quality in the cause and that 
in the effect.  My reading of Descartes however does not support this.  In Clatterbaugh’s reading, 
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eminent inheritance offers nothing that the other types of inheritance can not.  And it certainly 
does not accord with the description of eminent inheritance in the Meditations.  Here the 
example used in the context of the third meditation militates against that interpretation.  In the 
third meditation the first example given of eminent inheritance is that of inheritance of 
representative reality by ideas from intrinsic reality in the causes of ideas, which causes are 
external to the mind.  In this case, which does a lot of the work in the third meditation proof of 
the existence of God, the qualities in cause and effect cannot be numerically compared.  So in 
the example of the causation of the idea of the stone by the stone itself, Descartes makes no 
claims that there is a numerical relationship between the objective reality of the thought and the 
formal reality of the stone (Descartes 1967, p. 162).  Similarly, with the causation of heat in 
something, Descartes says it must be caused by something, not as hot or hotter (which would 
support Clatterbaugh’s interpretation) but by something “of an order…at least as perfect as heat” 
(Descartes 1967, p. 162)
Since God occupies the position of first cause in Descartes philosophy, both nature and man 
share in and reflect the nature of God.  In determining the area of similarity and expressing it in 
his behaviour, man can make his behaviour more God like and less base.  The next point is that 
nature had been seen for a long time (as far back as Pythagoras, but importantly for the 16th /17th 
centuries, by St Thomas (Yaker 1951)) to be a fundamentally ordered system, which would not 
be the case should God not be ordered as well.   It was this order that permitted the development 
of the arts and sciences.  It further followed that a thorough examination of the effect could give 
insights into the cause (since everything present in the effect must have been present in the 
cause), provided that insight into the effect was possible.  The possibility of insight was 
contingent on two factors, the intelligibility of the subject matter (the world) and the 
effectiveness of the tool used to examine it (the human intellect).  The inheritance by the world 
of order from God was seen as likely in light of the model of causation already mentioned, and it 
was order that permitted intelligibility.  That the human intellect was suited to effectively access 
truth about the world would become central in the development of the Similarity Thesis.
1.3 The Book of Nature
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The idea that the nature of God was recorded in the world led to the development of the idea of 
the two books, the book of scripture and the book of nature; both of which served to inform man 
about God, but in very different ways; the former through the traditional authority of the ancient 
patriarchs and apostles and contemporary priests and the latter through observation and reason 
interpreting that observation.  This dichotomy can be seen as early as the twelfth century in the 
writings of Hugh of St Victor but took on a modified form in the Early Modern period (Pesic, 
2000).  This leads to a model of science which combines the utility of knowledge to humanity (a 
la classic interpretations of Bacon’s philosophy of science in Valerius Terminus) with the value 
of knowledge as access to the divine (Tovey, 1952).  Bacon situated himself between the two 
extremes of seeing the nature of God as entirely deducible from scientific investigation of the 
world and that of considering the divine to be only accessible to the mind through contemplation 
(Tovey, 1952, p. 569).  Tovey claims that the commentators who have emphasised the secular 
influence of Bacon’s philosophy of science have neglected the place of the divine in his 
scientific project, with knowledge on the one hand coming from God as “a plant of God’s own 
planting”, a metaphor used by Descartes as well (Tovey, 1952, p. 570), and on the other 
glorifying God and preventing theological error since, “that latter book shall certify us that 
nothing which the first teacheth shall be thought impossible” (Valerius Terminus in Tovey, 
1952, p. 571).  In this model, study of the book of nature was understood both to give insight 
into the nature of God and humanity and to make people more God-like by exercising the human 
quality in which their similarity to God most clearly resided.  
According to Crease (2006), the modifications in the 17th century to the vision of the Book of 
Nature are specifically attributable to Galileo.  This is perhaps simplistic (attributing the 
development entirely to an individual) but his fundamental argument is about modern 
interpretations of the idea.  It does however put the shift firmly in the era of interest for this 
work.  For Crease this shift in the meaning of the metaphor was such that while prior to it, nature 
was to be interpreted as a symbolic system presenting the same message as religious texts and to 
be interpreted in their light while after the shift it was to be interpreted as a separate text offering 
its own independent access to divine truth and as such, was to be interpreted by a separate class 
of specialists from those who interpreted scripture.
Peregrine Dace: Chapter 1 Page 14 25/03/2010
1.4 Descartes’ Three Dimensions of Similarity
To consider how the Similarity Thesis was conceived of and expressed by Descartes in the 
Meditations on First Philosophy, God was seen to be omniscient about the world and transparent 
to himself, to affect the world without limit in choice or competence and to be all good.  In fact 
those things are so central to his notion of God that they lead him into the so-called Cartesian 
circle of self supporting proof.4   Likewise he considers three of those qualities to be possessed 
by mankind as well, knowing, choosing and acting (it is here that he so famously expresses the 
“will” version of the Similarity Thesis); 
For although the power of the will is incomparably greater in God than in 
me; both by reason of the knowledge and the power which, conjoined with it, 
render it stronger and more efficacious, and by reason of its object, inasmuch 
as in God it extends to a great many things; it nevertheless does not seem to 
me greater if I consider it formally and precisely in itself.  (Descartes 1967, 
p. 175).
4 The argument might be made that the compulsion to believe the clear and distinct, that would be dealt 
with in the Fourth Meditation prevents him from questioning it. This objection neglects that it is explicitly 
the  purpose  of  the  Evil  Genius  to  permit  hyperbolic  doubt  of  those  judgements  to  which  the  mind 
immediately springs. 
Writers such as DeRose (1992), Doney (1955), Morris (1973) and Newman and Nelson (1999) 
have argued for readings of this proof that permit escapes from circularity here, other writers however 
disagree.  Craig, whose work forms much of the basis for this work does not entirely agree with either 
position, for him the difficulty has,
…nothing to do with its leaning too heavily on clarity and distinctness or on any other 
general Cartesian principle.  Just the opposite: it is due to Descartes’ breach of one of his 
own rules in taking at face value just the kind of feelings or state of consciousness which, 
in the early Meditations he has thoroughly trounced as unreliable guides to truth. (Craig, 
1987)
It is this interpretation that I will be following.
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He does not here add goodness to the list but there is no reason to suspect that he did not think 
man to possess any; it does however seem to be a matter of being rather than doing.  Whatever 
the dimension of similarity however, it was common to distinguish intensive and extensive 
similarity.  For example Descartes distinguishes the will of God (his chosen dimension of 
similarity) from that of man only in the number of things on which it makes decisions, the 
amount of information on the basis of which those decisions are made and the capacity to 
execute the conclusion (should execution of some task be the desired result of the decision); in 
other words God’s will has a broader reach (extension) but no individual decision that he makes 
is made any more freely than those of man (intension).  The difference between the human and 
divine wills is thus a difference in the circumstances in which the wills operate rather than any 
difference between the wills themselves.  The intensive similarity between the will of God and 
that of man is exemplified by Descartes statement that, “… [God’s will] nevertheless does not 
seem to me greater if I consider it formally and precisely in itself (Descartes 1967, p. 175).  
Descartes offers us the prime example of the will or freedom version of the Similarity Thesis, 
but this was by no means the major Early Modern version.  In looking for others however we 
shall not abandon Descartes entirely.  An appropriate place to start looking would be his triad of 
actions, knowing, choosing and doing, these are the three dimensions along which he compares 
God and humans, finding that God is vastly more knowledgeable and has the power to affect 
vastly more objects before selecting choice as his dimension of similarity (Descartes, Haldane 
and Ross (ed & tr), 1967, p. 175).  Choosing has already been looked at in examining Descartes' 
free will version of the Similarity Thesis.  According to Craig (1987), for most Early Modern 
philosophers, action is never a likely candidate for the dimension of similarity. Leibniz however 
uses a version of it in Discourses Upon Metaphysics XXXVI (in part it seems, blending it with 
an element of the knowledge version) for he says a spirit (including the spirit of man) “knows 
the world, and conducts itself in it after the fashion of God” (Leibniz 1953 p. 61).  This line 
indicates that Leibniz thinks that man shares somehow in the active power of God.  Craig offers 
us some suggestions of how Early Modern philosophers might have conceived of the perfection 
of God’s actions, that the perfect agent might choose the correct goals, achieve them without 
effort and act without constraint.  To this list I would add that the perfect agent would have been 
seen to attain its ends instantly if so desired (this may be implicit in the term “effortlessly” that 
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Craig chooses, but instant and effortless are not synonymous).5  What can someone possibly do 
that exhibits one or more of these qualities?  It seems apparent that whatever it is should (as with 
Descartes’ “will” model) involve an intensive, rather than an extensive similarity.  Even without 
the constraint of seeking extensive similarity it is a difficult question to answer, as evidenced by 
the relative paucity of Early Modern philosophers who pursued this notion of similarity.  Even 
Leibniz, who provided us with the quote that introduces this dimension of similarity, does not do 
so in a pure fashion, i.e. without introducing another dimension of similarity  For Leibniz, our 
similarity to God’s actions lies in a correlation between his effortlessness in producing things 
and our effortlessness in producing thoughts.  “The mind,” he says in Principles of Nature and 
Grace XIV, “not only has perception of the works of God, but is even capable of producing 
something like them, though on a small scale.” (Craig 1987, p. 53)  As for what it produces, 
Leibniz offers us ideas, ideas particularly in the form of dreams flowing effortlessly from it, but 
also in its intentional states.   These intentional states are, in Leibniz’s model, not a result of 
focused, conscious thought but seem to result from the same (or similar) free flow of “thought 
stuff” as dreams.  Note that while I pointed to an overlap between Leibniz’ action model of 
similarity and the knowledge model we will be examining next, this exists only in so far as it is 
the production of thought that concerns him, it should not be understood from my comparison 
that he means true thoughts about the world (as implied by the word knowledge). 
Both Descartes’ “free will” model of similarity, and Leibniz’ “agency” model present certain 
problems to the reader.  Descartes’ because of his characteristic peculiar (certainly to twenty-
5 This list shows a distinct conflation that needs to be made clear (whether Craig makes it himself or is 
ascribing it to early modern thinkers is not apparent, though I suspect the latter).  This conflation comes 
with the introduction to the list of always choosing the correct goals.  Always choosing the correct goals 
requires an infallible knowledge of rightness and wrongness of alternatives and the ability to invariably 
choose the right option.  Without this, while correct goals may have been chosen in the past, no prediction 
can be made that they will inevitably be chosen in the future, or in counterfactual circumstances that 
render useless rules that coincidentally give the correct result.  This brings elements of the knowledge and 
freedom of choice (Descartes’ free will) into the “action” dimension of similarity.  We should be reminded 
of two things by this a) the idea of the unity of perfections (and perfection of unity) that is so strongly 
expressed in Descartes third Meditation; that these qualities were not easily separable from each other in 
the notion of a perfect God in the 17th century; and b) that this threefold model of the dimensions of 
similarity between man and God is imperfect in that it does not cleanly separate all expressions, even all 
early modern expressions of the Similarity Thesis, but only exists as a tool to help us interpret the 
components of these expressions.
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first century eyes) reliance on “clear and distinct” understanding of God’s nature (primarily non-
deception here but also unitary perfection in general) and Leibniz’ because it is not clear how 
agency and intention or dreams can be meaningfully equated as he does (Again intensively.  He 
never comes close to suggesting extensive equality, nor should we expect him to).   Descartes' 
ideal of a perfect will is only tenable within a world view that also admits of human error and an 
omnipotent, omniscient God who is not the author of error.  Without these there are four 
possibilities: there is no human error, God is the author of human error, God is limited in his 
abilities, or has an Epicurean lack of interest in humanity, or God does not exist.  Given that 
Descartes is quite reasonably convinced of the existence of past error and the possibility of 
future error and does not need to justify it again, a lack of a perfectly free will would call his 
ideas about God into question.  The problem with Leibniz’ model is that it seems to make 
analogy a basis for a strong Similarity Thesis, conflating two senses of the work “like”.  It is 
clear how the perceived effortlessness of dreams and intention can be compared to God’s 
effortless action, but this is not the same thing as providing a dimension of similarity in any 
stronger sense.  
With these flaws, from where do these models draw their persuasive power (such as it is)?  Well 
let us look first to their commonalities for the answer.  What they share is drawing implicitly on 
another model of similarity, the knowledge model (in its various versions) that Craig identifies 
as the Insight Ideal.  Descartes draws strength for his argument from this model more clearly 
than Leibniz does but it is nonetheless present in the latter’s work.  For Leibniz the influence is 
that mental activity is the human quality that is compared to God’s action rather than it being 
human action that is used in the comparison, for example in Principles of Nature and Grace XIV 
he says
The rational soul or mind…is…an image of the Deity…the soul is 
architectonic in its voluntary activities also, and, discovering the science in 
accordance with which God has regulated things, it imitates in its own 
sphere, and in the little world in which it is allowed to act, what God 
performs in the great world (Craig 1987, p. 53).  
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So God’s action in creating the world serves as, in Thomistic terminology, the causa 
exemplaris (external formal cause) for the human sub-creation of a mental model of the 
world.
For Descartes, the impact of the Insight Ideal is far more direct and explicit.  In the fourth 
Meditation, Descartes equates the source of error in human choice with the source of 
epistemological error.  Our freedom applies just as much (for Descartes) to belief formation as it 
does to any area in which choice is possible (if we take seriously for the purposes of this 
discussion that belief formation in the sense he means is a matter of free choice).  This 
identification of formation of untrue beliefs about the world with sin suggests that the Insight 
Ideal has a more important place in Descartes’ version of the Similarity Thesis than Craig 
admits.  
1.5 Knowledge and Virtue: The Christian Tradition
The close association between knowledge, sin and righteousness is not one found only in 
Descartes’ thought, nor even only in Early Modern philosophy and theology.  It can be seen in 
Christian doctrine as far back as the 5th century and as recently as 1993.  In the Pelagian heresy, 
sin was seen as a function not of a fallen human nature but of misuse of the will and further this 
misuse of the will could be guarded against by knowledge of the law.  In other words it was 
thought that knowledge of the moral law was accessible to people and that application of this 
knowledge through action could prevent the development of a state of sin, not merely that 
knowledge was a way to escape sin, but that it was the only way to avoid it (Proceedings of the 
Synod Of Lydda as quoted by St Augustine of Hippo in “On the Proceedings of Pelagius”). 
Until the attacks launched on Pelagianism by St Augustine in the 5th c., it was not seen as 
particularly problematic (It was declared not unorthodox by the Synod of Lydda) and it was 
certainly informed by earlier orthodox writers such as Ambrosiaster (Evans, 1981).  While this 
doctrine was eventually declared heretical as a result of the actions of Augustine, Pelagius’ 
followers certainly saw themselves as mainstream Christians (integri Christiani) (Evans, 1981). 
Augustine’s passionate opposition to this doctrine notwithstanding, he is equally concerned (in 
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De Libero Arbitrio III.18) with the human condition of ignorance and its retarding effect on the 
human spiritual condition.
Despite the heretical classification of this doctrine, elements of it remain in Catholic dogma 
today.  In the encyclical Veritatis Splendor, Pope John Paul II (1991) said “Truth enlightens 
man's intelligence and shapes his freedom…”.  While actively denying the Pelagian possibility 
of atheistic true knowledge6 (and thus the Pelagian possibility of atheistic sinlessness through 
knowledge), this encyclical reaffirms Papal acceptance of Thomism in that
Among all others, the rational creature is subject to divine providence in the 
most excellent way, insofar as it partakes of a share of providence, being 
provident both for itself and for others. Thus it has a share of the Eternal 
Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end. This 
participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called natural law 
(John Paul II 1991)
And further that
[God] cares for man not "from without", through the laws of physical nature, 
but "from within", through reason, which, by its natural knowledge of God's 
eternal law, is consequently able to show man the right direction to take in 
his free actions [ibid.].
The presence of these ideas in this context demonstrates three things.  First, that freedom of will 
and sin are deeply connected in the history of Catholic thought.  Secondly that central to the 
relationship between them is knowledge to inform the will.  Third, that Descartes’ close 
association between freedom and the supposed tendency of the mind to leap to items revealed by 
the natural light is consistent with a vareity of positions within Christian thought (and have been 
seen as consistent for a long time).
6 Though it does reaffirm the Second Vatican Council judgement that ignorant heathens of conscience may 
attain salvation through grace.
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This Christian context clarifies the links in the fourth meditation between sin and 
epistemological error.  Since he states that his errors are the only evidence of his imperfection 
then sin must be included in this category of error, or at least be considered to have essential 
similarities.  These Christian writers on sin also make this link, claiming sin other than original 
sin to be a product of epistemological error and that resistance to divine knowledge is what 
keeps people in the state of sin.  This link identifies two senses of the word freedom with one 
another, that of unconstrained choice and that of being “free of sin”.  
The importance of Augustinian thought to Cartesian thought should not be neglected.  From the 
Augustinian statement “If I doubt, I exist”7 (City of God XI.26) to his insistence on duality, 
Augustine defined the religious doctrine in the tradition of which Descartes would be educated. 
Augustine of course is as interested in non-rational decision making as he in the rational, bearing 
strongly as they do on the process of his own conversion (Confessions VIII) but he is also heir to 
the Hellenistic philosophical tradition that elevates the faculty of reason above all others in the 
decision making process , witness for example De Libero Arbitrio II.3 – II.15.  This rational 
decision making is strongly and explicitly tied to obedience to the divine law in City of God 
XII.1
…the rational nature, even in its wretchedness, is superior to the nature…
bereft of reason…This being so, the failure to adhere to God must be a 
perversion in this rational nature…though it is itself changeable, it can yet 
obtain blessedness by adhering to the unchangeable good. (Augustine 1984)
Descartes denies significant Augustinian influence on his project but Janowski (2004) has 
identified themes that occupy major positions in both, including the cogito and the evil genius, 
and used them to argue a significant debt that Descartes owes to Augustine.  Menn (1998) 
further argues that Descartes explanation of error is an appropriation of Augustine’s free-will 
theodicy, particularly as expressed in De Libero Arbitrio.  He argues that Descartes’ 
conceptualisation of false judgements as being the result of the inappropriate use of the will is a 
7 Si enim fallor, sum. 
Peregrine Dace: Chapter 1 Page 21 25/03/2010
strong and definite link between the projects of the two men.  This does not of course mean that 
Descartes simply extracted his ideas from Augustine’s works, there were many mechanisms 
through whichh he might have come in contact with the ideas contained within them.
There is a strong connection between the use of the will and the knowledge that informs the will 
in both Descartes work and the work of his antecedents.  Descartes explicitly makes the free will 
the dimension of similarity between humans and God, but both he and Augustine are at pains to 
point out that it is not a moral good in itself but is the mechanism permitting both terrible 
epistemological and moral error.  Likewise it is epistemological error that licenses and 
empowers misuses of the will.  It is knowledge in the case of both thinkers that permits error to 
be avoided.  And it is the avoidance of this error that increases the similarity between humans 
and God just as it is commission of the error that separates us.  As Augustine says, “…the image 
needs to be refashioned and brought to perfection, so to become close to him [God] in 
resemblance.” (City of God XI.26)  
It seems that both Descartes’ freedom model and Leibniz’ action model draw on elements of the 
Insight Ideal, which it is worth examining in some depth.  A leading light in Early Modern 
science and philosophy of science, Galileo relied upon the Insight Ideal in his notion of 
similarity and in his justification of his intellectual project.  For Galileo, the Book of Nature was 
the most direct access that a man of learning had to understanding the nature of God, and of 
himself.  In his Dialogue Concerning the Two World Systems, Simplicio says to Salvatio (who 
speaks largely for Galileo) that they have just established that there is a vast gap in 
understanding between man and God, yet he reserves some of his greatest praise, “if not indeed 
the greatest of all … for the understanding which you attribute to natural man.” (Craig 1987) 
This does not seem to be a problem however for Salvatio, or indeed for Galileo.  It is in this 
discussion that he establishes both his commitment to the Insight Ideal of the Similarity Thesis 
(though of course not in those terms) and establishes the difference between intensive and 
extensive similarity, a distinction that would colour the entire history of the Similarity Thesis.  In 
that extract from the Dialogue, Galileo claims great honours for human understanding, but this is 
not yet an explicit claim that understanding is the dimension of similarity.
Peregrine Dace: Chapter 1 Page 22 25/03/2010
Later in the same text however, it becomes clear that he is making this human quality 
(understanding) the basis of a strong statement of Similarity.  Salvatio claims that;
With regard to [that] which the human intellect does understand, I believe its 
knowledge equals the divine in objective certainty, for here it succeeds in 
understanding necessity, beyond which there can be no greater sureness. 
(Craig 1987)
And here Galileo, through the mouth of Salvatio, makes explicit the distinction that seems to be 
important for all versions of the Similarity Thesis that we have discussed; that of intensive and 
extensive similarity.  Salvatio limits this great objective certainty to certain specific areas of 
knowledge, for neither he nor any other Early Modern philosopher makes claims for the 
universal scope and perfection of human knowledge.  Rather he limits it to particular fields, 
geometry and arithmetic, in which the necessity of the truths of those fields of knowledge are 
accessible to the human mind.  Here they are not merely accessible in principle, but many of 
these truths have been discovered8 in practice.  Galileo’s specific choice of these particular fields 
of knowledge prove to be very important to the Early Modern scientific developments discussed 
in Chapter 2 and central to the approach to science adopted by the teachers of the “Destreza” 
tradition.  It is this centralising of thought in the Similarity Thesis that seems to inform both 
Descartes and Leibniz in their own version of the Thesis. 
Once we have identified thought as the major field of interest there are several aspects of it to 
which the thesis can be applied; speed or ease of understanding or of acquisition of knowledge, 
extent of knowledge and the certainty or what we might call “intensity” of understanding.  If we 
start with a concept of a perfect God, and in considering this time and place we should, all of 
these  will  be  maximised,  so  what  combination  of  them  will  be  appropriate  for  drawing 
comparisons with man?  By the very nature of their calling these were men to whom intellectual 
endeavour was very familiar (and it is interesting to note that it is men with these particular skills 
who selected them as the areas in which man came closest to God, but that discussion falls 
outside the scope of this work).  For none of these men did knowledge or understanding come 
8 To use an early modern understanding of the development of mathematics.
Peregrine Dace: Chapter 1 Page 23 25/03/2010
instantly or without effort (despite Galileo’s view that assiduously practiced mental exercises 
may  become  as  smooth  as  to  feel  almost  effortless).   Neither  did  anyone  feel  that  they 
understood everything or indeed everything on one subject.  The only thing then remaining (or at 
least the only thing which they had identified) then becomes the intensity of a given piece of 
knowledge, the certainty with which it can be said to be known.
Leibniz, Descartes and Galileo all make quite clear that they are talking about intensive rather 
than extensive similarity in their chosen dimension of similarity.  For Leibniz we differ “from 
God only as greater from lesser, as finite from infinite.” (Leibniz’ letter to Arnauld of 9 th of 
October 1687 in Craig 1987, p. 51).  For Descartes, the difference that God’s will is further 
reaching and better informed than his, but “nevertheless does not seem to me greater”.  Galileo 
likewise distinguishes quantity of knowledge from its certainty in the above quote from Craig 
(1987).   Descartes’  statement  here  has  the  potential  to  be  interpreted  as  breaking  the 
intensive/extensive model because of the presence of the term “greatness” in this translation. 
The context however makes it clear that he is in no way making a claim that includes extensive 
similarity, but rather is making a claim similar to that of Galileo.  The characteristic they are 
discussing (free will  and the ability to recognise logical  necessity)  is  being characterised as 
either  present  or  absent  and  therefore  extension  is  irrelevant  to  them  and  they  cannot  be 
measured on any scale of extensive similarity.  Insofar as that is the case, it is only intensive 
similarity to which they refer.
Now that we have established the terms of comparison in the Similarity Thesis it is time to 
examine the nature of comparison both in itself and in terms of the specifics of the Early Modern 
Similarity Thesis.   Comparisons  may be said to have two functions,  the descriptive and the 
didactic (which are by no means mutually exclusive); the descriptive telling the listener/reader 
something about the world (at least those parts of it that are being described) and the didactic 
attempting to instil understanding in the listener/reader about one or other term of comparison or 
the relationship between the two.   The descriptive must  have a didactic component  (it must 
convey  some  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  two  things)  but  the  reverse  is  not 
necessarily  true;  attempts  to  communicate  understanding  about  something  may  involve 
analogies that do not describe real affinities, relationships or similarities but rather “useful lies” 
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that guide a pragmatic understanding.  I suggest that all Early Modern versions of the Similarity 
Thesis  are  both  descriptive  and  didactic: they  represent  what the  authors  think  are  real 
relationships in the world and are thought of as instructive about both terms of the comparison. 
A solely didactic comparison without a descriptive element would imply that they did not feel 
that any real relationship of similarity existed between humans and God.  This however is not 
borne out by the texts, particularly in the case of Descartes’ writings, in which we see him going 
to significant lengths to establish the reality of the relationship and in which he bases similarly 
significant  tracts  of  reasoning  on  that  idea.   For  Galileo,  in  the  quotes  already given,  the 
language is that of comparison rather than that of claims about the world, in other words it is not 
necessarily  a  descriptive  comparison.   They  do  not,  however  rule  this  possibility  out  and 
nowhere does he state that this comparison is solely for the purpose of illustration or that it is not 
to be taken seriously.  
According  to,  among  others,  Mary  Hesse  (Hesse  and  Arbib,  1986),  analogies  modify  the 
meanings of not only one of the terms of comparison, as may intuitively be understood  from 
comparisons of the form A is like B (1), but both terms are objects of comparison, more like A 
and B are like each other (1’).  1’ does not however entirely convey the sense of her argument as 
it has the potential to be understood as an overlap of properties of objects that statically possess 
those properties.  Here we must distinguish between ontological and epistemological concerns. 
In so far as comparisons are made between qualities held by objects and in the context of the 
comparisons being studied in this work it is epistemological claims that I am making, though my 
sources were, in many cases making claims about the world.  It is precisely because they were 
making claims about the world that the interactive theory of metaphor offers us so much here.
1.6 In Conclusion
In this chapter, we have established much of the background needed to understand Thibault’s 
Academie.  Many early modern philosophers were promoting a view of the human and the divine 
that emphasised their essential  similarity.   This view extended the borders of acceptable and 
attainable  knowledge  about  the  divine  and  the  natural  by  using  descriptive  and  didactic 
comparisons in which the mind, and particularly the rational mind, was the major dimension of 
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similarity.  This mind, operating within a world that was seen as a product of a rational agent 
similar in nature to it, was capable of understanding that world in a manner intensively like the 
way God did and by understanding that world, could understand certain truths about God.  This 
view made the practice of science a pursuit  that was capable of philosophically approaching 
metaphysical  truths, not  merely physical  ones, and a potentially religious activity in its  own 
right.  
In the next chapter we will look at certain changes taking place within the sciences in the Early 
Modern  period,  particularly  the  inclusion  of  the  mathematic  within  the  sciences  proper. 
Mathematics is important for the relationship described in chapter 1 because it is the science 
most reliant on, as its Early Modern proponents suggested, the rational mind, and least reliant on 
the vagaries of observation.  It is also important for the study of Thibault because of its bridging 
of the gap between trade or technical knowledge and scientific and metaphysical knowledge.
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Chapter 2:  Knowing the World
In the previous chapter, I discussed the importance  of the mind to 17 th century philosophers in 
their idea of human similarity with, and understanding of, the divine, in part through rational 
investigation of the world.  In this chapter I will consider the question of how the intellect was to 
accomplish that task.  Section 2.1 of this chapter will consider the methods promoted by Early 
Modern  apologists  for  mathematics  by  which  the  mind  could  best  understand  nature,  in 
particular, mathematics  and its place  within the academic environment of the universities and 
within natural  science.   Then in  section 2.2 I  will  consider  how  the mathematical  methods 
discussed in 2.2 bear on the ideas of similarity discussed in Chapter 1.
The period 1500-1700 has been claimed as the formative era for the developments that would be 
institutionalised in the sciences in the 19th century (Dear 1995).  Key to these developments was 
the shifting status of mathematics and the mixed mathematical sciences1 (particularly astronomy 
and  optics  for  the  early  part  of  that  period,  along  with  mechanics).   Under  the  form  of 
Aristotelianism dominant  in  the 16th century,  mathematics  was  not  considered a science but 
rather a tool useful in the sciences proper since it did not speak of the world and did not give 
people knowledge about causal relationships between its objects of study (Dear 1995 pp35-37). 
This opinion was particularly strong among the followers of Piccolomini and the authors of the 
influential Coïmbra commentaries on Aristotle (Wallace 1984 p142) and through them, on the 
Jesuit  educational system as a whole.  Contrary to this was the view that mathematics fitted 
perfectly within the Aristotelian definition of science with reference to both its method and its 
subject matter.  The first portion of this chapter will deal with the process by academics' opinion 
of mathematics changed from the former view to the competing latter, resulting in a view of 
mathematics more familiar to the 21st century mind.
2.1 Breaching Disciplinary Boundaries
1 The mixed mathematical sciences were the category of sciences in the Aristotelian scientific tradition 
that used mathematical methods to investigate non-mathematical objects.  Discussed further in section 
2.1.2.
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The state of affairs faced by the proponents of the new view of mathematics and the process by 
which they changed the position of their discipline are examples of the dynamic relationships 
that  existed  between Renaissance  humanism,  medieval  philosophy (especially  the  scholastic 
tradition) and the authority of the ancients in the 16th and 17th centuries.  
Key to this process was the Jesuit mathematician Christopher Clavius.  Professor of mathematics 
at the Collegio Romano (now the Pontifical Gregorian University) from 1565 to 1612, he was 
one  of  the  most  influential  proponents  of  a  new  conceptualisation  of  mathematics.   This 
importance is the result not only of his mathematical expertise and his having written some well 
thought  of  mathematical  texts,  but  his  position  within  the  Jesuit  educational  system.   The 
Collegio Romano was one of the most important educational institutions established by Loyola 
and  occupied  a  place  of  significant  seniority  in  the  development  of  the  Jesuit  educational 
programme.  The Jesuit programme formed a central part of the Counter-Reformation, but as 
Cesareo  (1993)  points  out,  the  Jesuit  educational  mission  balances  these  Counter-
Reformationary goals with those of the personal development of the pupil and benefit  to his 
society.   These goals were not unrelated as for an orthodox Catholic thinker like Loyola, an 
enlightened, moral person and society was a Roman Catholic person or society (though as the 
presence  of  reformatory  pressures  inside  the  Church  shows,  the  reverse  was  not  seen  as 
necessarily the case).
The problems with which those for whom mathematics was a science proper (in the Aristotelian 
sense) were faced related to how the academic degree structure had evolved by the 16th century. 
The focus of the late medieval university degree was professional training in one of the “big 
three” fields; theology, law and medicine.  Mathematical training was limited to the liberal arts 
courses comprising the classical trivium (grammar, logic and rhetoric) and quadrivium (music, 
astronomy, geometry and arithmetic) which prepared students for advanced study in the higher 
faculties.  As such, teachers of mathematical disciplines were considered both different from (cf 
Salmone  1979, Baldini  1992)  and  lower  in  status  than  teachers  of  philosophy  and  natural 
philosophy (cf Galluzzi 1973), those being the disciplines with which Clavius would associate 
mathematics.
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The principal objections to giving mathematics the status of a science (and so making it a proper 
part of philosophical study) were that it did not provide knowledge about the world; that it did 
not  operate  recognisably  through  the  scholastic  causes2 (Wallace  1984, Dear  1995).   The 
requirements of the late scholastics for a field of study to be considered science proper were 
strict ones.  The tenor of the attacks on the status of mathematics can be gleaned from Clavius’ 
mathematical  apologetics.   In the 1580s he wrote against the philosophy teachers who were 
dismissive of mathematics, saying there were those who claimed that “mathematical sciences are 
not sciences, do not have demonstrations, abstract from being and the good etc” Clavius presents 
some  counter  arguments  to  these,  some  technical,  for  example  that  the  importance  of 
mathematics  to  astronomy and cosmology made  mathematics  an inextricable  part  of  natural 
philosophy; some textual, for example that it was impossible to understand certain passages in 
the  classical  philosophical  authorities  without  mathematical  understanding; and  some  social 
advice, encouraging mathematicians and mathematics instructors to take part in public events 
and debates to enhance the profile of their discipline in the academic world. (Society of Jesus, 
1901.  Translated in Dear 1995 pp 34-36)
The major objection the anti-mathematics voices raised was that of causation.  Central to the late 
scholastic understanding of Aristotle’s scientific categories was the causal demonstration of a 
scientific principle in the form of a deductive syllogism.  The ideal version of this syllogism was 
one in which the middle term expressed the necessary and sufficient cause of the effect to be 
explained (Dear 1995, p36).  For mathematics, and particularly geometry this was not seen to be 
the  case  by  those  who  denied  it  scientific  status.   In  their  view,  what  mathematical 
demonstrations expressed was the logical relationship between ideas, there was no causation 
involved.   The  fact  that  mathematics  dealt  with  the  relationship  between  ideas  specifically 
allowed another blow to be struck against it.  In the model of mathematics prevalent among the 
late scholastics with whom Clavius  was disagreeing,   mathematical  objects  existed nowhere 
outside the mind and therefore nothing dealing with their relationships or natures was seen as 
sharing any essentiality with objects in the world, and according to Aristotle:
2 Aristotle’s model of causes was central to the scholastic understanding of science.  A scientific 
demonstration was to show not the existence of an effect but its necessity given the nature of its cause and 
the operation of material, efficient, final and formal causation, any or all of which could be invoked in a 
given explanation (Falcon 2006).
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Attributes which are not essential in the sense which we have defined do not 
admit  of  demonstrative  knowledge,  since  it  is  not  possible  to  give  a 
necessary  proof  of  the  conclusion…(Aristotle,  Posterior  Analytics I.6  tr. 
Treddenick 1962)
This  was not a claim that mathematical concepts do not have essential characteristics, but that 
their  essential  characteristics  are  not  shared  by those  objects  that  are  studied  in  the  mixed 
mathematical  sciences, i.e. those  that  used  the  principles  of  mathematics  to  treat  of  non-
mathematical objects such as optics (using geometry to treat of vision and light) and acoustics 
(using  arithmetic  to  treat  of  sound).   If  the  objects  of  fencing  were  appropriate  objects  of 
scientific knowledge in the same way that light, sound or astronomical bodies were and if they 
and  their  interactions  could  be  mathematically  described  then  a  mathematical  approach  to 
fencing would also fit into this category, since it would use geometry to treat of the human body 
and its motion.  Thibault devotes most of his first chapter to establishing that the human body 
and the  sword  were  governed  by  the  same  laws  as  the  rest  of  nature  and  describing  their 
proportions in terms of geometric figures to justify this conclusion (see Appendix A).
For Clavius it was difficult to directly contradict these criticisms, and it is easy for us to see why. 
If the nature of science requires necessary  causal relationships, and causality was defined  as 
described above, then there is no way that mathematics could be considered a science within the 
Aristotelian tradition.  The only options acceptable to defenders of mathematics would be to 
change how the idea of causality was applied or to change the definition of science itself to 
permit mathematics within its borders.  When defining the relationship of two things (science 
and mathematics  in this case) to one another,  either or both of them can have its  definition 
modified  but  the  supporters  of  mathematics  did  not  propose  to  change  the  definition  of 
mathematics, this implies that they placed more importance on the purity of mathematics than on 
orthodoxy in their  interpretations of Aristotle.    Both strategies (reinterpreting causation and 
changing the terms by which science was defined) would be applied  to some extent, but the 
former would be the one used most immediately by the proponents of mathematics-as-science.  
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2.1.1 Causal relations in mathematics
How then could the detailing of logical relationships between ideas that comprised mathematical 
demonstration be made conceptually equivalent to the understanding of causal relationships (and 
importantly, their necessity) between non-ideal things and events in the world that comprised 
science?  Doing this would require the demonstration that whilst the characteristics of science 
and mathematics might not be the same, at least the cognate characteristics of the objects of and 
within each field relate to one other in the same way.  
These relationships within each field of study can be expressed in the following form, a form 
which emphasizes the parallels between mathematics and the sciences.
1s: The objects of scientific enquiry are the physical objects that interact with one another in 
the world.
1m: The objects of mathematical enquiry are the conceptual objects3 such as numbers or lines 
and the relationships between them.
2s: The essential characteristics of the objects of scientific enquiry include volume, shape, 
movement, composition, function.
2m: The essential characteristics of objects of mathematical enquiry are number, magnitude 
and angle.
For instances of causation involving objects of scientific enquiry the composition, for example, 
of the causal agent acts as causa materialis of the composition of the effect, so to generalise the 
example:
3s:   When  an  object  of  scientific  enquiry  acts  as  a  cause  of  another  such  object,  the 
characteristics of the cause are causally responsible for the characteristics of the effect.
3 According to Blancanus’ Dissertatio (pp 5-7), they are objects by virtue of being entia per se and that 
their existing only in the mind does not detract from this.  He adds that all science abstracts from its 
objects’ specific existences and that this is no different for mathematical objects.  (Wallace, 1984. p 142)
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The  simplest  case  of  this  process  is  like  that  of  composition  mentioned  above,  where  the 
relationship between cause and effect is between characteristics of the same type.
For mathematics to be a science then there would have to be a true statement 3m that corresponds 
to  3s,  or  some  other  statement  that  similarly  defines  mathematical  causation  as  sharing  its 
essential properties with scientific causation.
It was Blancanus, a student at the Collegio Romano under Clavius (Wallace, 1984. p 141), who 
drew the major parallels between causal relationships within science and within mathematics 
(specifically within geometry).   Magnitude,  he  said in  1615 in  De mathematicatrum natura 
dissertation  una  cum  clarorum  mathematicorum  chronologia,  is  equivalent  to  the  matter 
composing physical objects.  Mathematical objects, being objects (see footnote 3) and composed 
of  intelligible  matter,  are  composed  of  parts  that  are  sufficient  to  serve  as  material  causes 
exhibiting properties (Wallace, 1984. p 142).   For this reason, mathematical demonstrations 
relying on magnitude are equivalent to syllogisms demonstrating scientific causation where the 
middle term of the syllogism expresses material causation and so geometrical demonstrations 
use material  causation.   Further,  he argued,  descriptions of  geometrical  objects  specify their 
essences (form and magnitude) and so used formal causes as well (Dear, 1995 p 40, also cf. 
Wallace, 1984 pp 142-143).  In this argument, Blancanus restricts his comments to geometry,  
but the same arguments can be made of arithmetical demonstrations.
These arguments for causation in mathematical demonstrations draw on the tradition of debates 
on the nature of mathematical objects.  Early Modern mathematicians and philosophers drew on 
two major classical  sources for their definitions of  mathematical  objects,  Aristotle and Plato 
(Radford, 2004. pp 5-8).  Both philosophers understood mathematical objects to be different in 
some way from the physical manifestations of   those objects (lines from straight things, circles 
from round things, number from groups of things) but they differed in their understanding of the 
nature of that difference.  For Aristotle, mathematical objects were abstracted from the physical; 
they were known through the senses and then understood.  Saying, for example
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The mathematician is able to study surfaces, volumes, lengths and points in 
isolation from their physical instantiations because…he is able to separate 
the two in thought…Having been separated by thought, mathematical objects 
are free from the changes which physical objects undergo. (Aristotle, Physics 
II, 193b33-34)
Implicit in this statement is the dependence of mathematical ideas on  the separateness of the 
object from the object as perceived, since it is the object in thought that is separated, not the 
obect in the world.  This dependence is made explicit in his De Anima in which he claims that all 
learning is sense dependent and further that conceptual objects require images, images which 
behave like “sensuous contents except in that they contain no matter” (De Anima, III, 8).  This 
abstraction allows the mathematician freedom from the vagaries of specific instances to make 
universal judgments about mathematical objects.  
Plato took quite a different view.  Rather than the objects being ideas abstracted from sense, they 
are perceived by the mind independent from the senses.  They existed the  outside mind, but 
present to it.  Mathematical objects occupy an important place in the Platonist theory of Forms 
(Brown, 1999 p 24).  The reason for its special place in Platonism is a problem that Kant would 
later present in a way that I think is enlightening (though he draws very different conclusions to 
either Plato or Blancanus).  This is by no means a problem unique to the period of Clavius and 
his  disciples; for  example  in  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason Kant  distinguishes  mathematical 
concepts from those he thinks of as more purely philosophical by virtue of their having exact 
definitions (Smith, 1962. p 564), contrasting them with, for example the lack of precise shared 
definition in legal and moral philosophers’ understanding of the right (Kant 1929. p 588).  If the 
Forms are present to the mind and in some non-sensory way perceivable by it, then the ease with 
which mathematical Forms were understood makes them ideal examples for development and 
expansion of Platonism, more so than any other Forms of abstract concepts.  The special nature 
of mathematical concepts among the Forms can be seen in Speusippus’ (Plato’s nephew and 
successor) rejection of all other Forms but mathematicals (Tarán, 1981. p. 23) (mathematicals 
being the term to distinguish mathematical Forms from other Forms by e.g. Tarán, 1981 and 
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Mendell,  2004.   Some  commentators  consider  them  to  be  a  separate  class  of  existents 
intermediate between phenomena and ideas e.g Petrie, 1911).
Blancanus  drew on  both  the  Aristotelian  and  Platonic  models  of  mathematical  concepts  in 
developing  his  ideas  on  mathematical  causation.   Following  Plato  he  classed  mathematical 
objects as independent intelligible objects.
These do not exist in the nature of things, since in the mind of the Author of 
Nature,  as  well  as  in  the  human  mind,  their  ideas  do  exist  as  the  exact 
archetypes  of  all  things,  indeed,  as  exact  mathematical  entities,  the 
mathematician investigates their ideas, which are primarily intended per se, 
and which are true entities. (Dissertatio, quoted in Mancosu, 1996. p. 180)
He does however also adopt Aristotelian views, saying that the phrase “mathematical perfection” 
is  a way of describing the perfection of that which is abstracted from the sensible (Mancosu 
1996. p 180).  
The combination of Platonic and Aristotelian elements in Blancanus’ writing indicates that we 
should not be surprised to find such a combination in other writings of the period.  It may also 
stem from a problem in adopting a more purely Platonic perspective.  For Blancanus to achieve a 
general academic acceptance of Mathematics as a science, he would need general acceptance 
that it obeyed Aristotelian causal laws and abandoning the Aristotelian framework for a purely 
Platonic one, would preclude that acceptance from being given.  The combination also reminds 
us that even though the followers of Clavius, such as Blancanus classified the sciences in ways 
that differed from the dominant Scholastic classification of science, they agreed that Aristotle’s 
model of science was broadly correct.  There are some parts of Plato’s philosophy of number 
that make it difficult to fully integrate with Aristotelian science. According to Wallace (1984 p. 
142),  for  example,  it  is  the  divisibility  of  mathematical  concepts  into component  parts  that 
renders  them suitable  as  Aristotelian causes,  with each separable  property responsible  for  a 
property of the effect.  For Plato however, mathematical concepts such as the ideal numbers are 
perfect unities, indivisible (Tarán 1981 p 14).  This indivisibility makes it difficult to adopt a 
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purely Platonic position,  as does the institutional  importance of the Aristotelian position for 
those who were trying to justify mathematics as a Scholastic science.
Arithmetical demonstrations can also be framed in the terms Blancanus uses to make geometry 
an example of scientific mathematics but geometry is markedly more important in Blancanus’ 
attack on the boundary between mathematics and science.  The relationship between geometry 
and arithmetic in the context of this debate and this period do demand closer attention but it is 
geometry that is used in the mathematical approach of Thibault and his antecedents and so the 
specific place of arithmetic is not critical to this dissertation.  
2.1.2 Ancient Authority
Blancanus’  approach  to  the  problem  dealt  with  the  primary  methodological  objection  to 
mathematics’ place among the sciences.  The next objection to be dealt with was that  which 
required sciences to fit within the scholastic system of classifying the sciences and defining their 
relationships to one another, and denied that mathematics did so.
The first  and simplest  approach was that  taken by Clavius,  to begin with what  was already 
assented to: that mathematics was a valuable tool in certain sciences, and then to extend that 
idea.  The importance of mathematics to the scientific enterprise was pretty well accepted by 
teachers of philosophy contemporary with Clavius.  It was particularly useful in the so-called 
mixed or subordinate sciences.  These, such as optics, astronomy and music, used mathematics 
to examine non-mathematical objects (hence the “mixed” appellation), this ran contrary to the 
paradigm of science at the time but the  value of using mathematical techniques in these fields 
had become apparent.   Clavius  used this  model  of  the  sciences  and the place of  the  mixed 
sciences in Aristotle’s writings to argue for the inclusion of mathematics.  The paradigm for a 
science in the Aristotelian tradition required the science to obey the rule that their principles of a 
science be of the same type as the objects of that science, nevertheless Aristotle made a special 
dispensation  for  the  mixed  sciences,  allowing  them  within  the  sciences  despite  their 
composition. So for example, 
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Hence it is not possible to prove a fact by passing from one genus to another 
–e.g.,  to  prove  a  geometrical  proposition  by arithmetic.   There  are  three 
factors  in  a  demonstration:  (1)  The  conclusion  which  is  required  to  be 
proved, i.e., the application of an essential attribute to some genus; (2) the 
axioms  on  which  the  proof  is  based;  (3)  the  underlying  genus,  whose 
modifications or essential attributes are disclosed by the demonstration. 
and later in the same chapter
How  transference  [between  genera]  is  possible  in  some  cases  will  be 
explained later.  Arithmetical demonstrations always keep to the genus which 
is the subject of the demonstration, and similarly with all the other sciences. 
Thus  the  genus  will  be  the  same,  either  absolutely  or  in  some  respect. 
(Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I.7 1962a) (insertion mine)
According to Treddenick (1962a), the phrase “in some respect” refers to the mixed (or as he puts 
it, subaltern) sciences.  Further, in Metaphysics XIII.3, Aristotle proceeded to show how mixed 
sciences  are  legitimate  sciences  despite  their  apparent  breach  of  the  rule  requiring  internal 
coherence of principle and object in a science.  
…neither [harmonics nor optics] studies objects qua sight or qua sound, but 
qua lines and numbers; yet the latter are affections peculiar to the former. 
The same is also true of mechanics.
Thus if we regard objects independently of their attributes and investigate 
any aspect of them as so regarded, we shall not be guilty of any error on this 
account, any more than when we draw a diagram on the ground and say that 
a line is a foot long when it is not; because the error is not in the premises. 
The best way to conduct an investigation is to take that which does not exist 
in separation and consider it separately; which is just what the arithmetician 
or the geometrician does.  (Aristotle,  Metaphysics XIII.3 1962b) (insertion 
mine)
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Clavius makes the argument that if Aristotle actively provided a special category of the sciences 
to  permit  the  mathematical  fields  to  fall  under  the  definition  “science”,  as  he  did,  then  he 
intended them to be considered sciences proper and any commentary on Aristotle denying this 
was based on a profound misunderstanding (Dear, 1995 p.39).  
2.1.3 From object to method.
The previous two objections that Blancanus and Clavius dealt  with were concerned with the 
subject matter of mathematics and applied mathematics; the first that the subject matter could 
not  demonstrate  necessary  causation,  and  the  second  that  the  subject  matter  of  the  mixed 
sciences was not of the same type as the mathematical principles they used.  The next major 
apology for mathematics to which we turn would bypass the question of subject matter almost 
entirely  and  deal  solely with  its  methodology and  the  type  of  outcome  resulting  from this 
methodology.
According to Clavius, mathematics “alone preserves the way and procedure of a science.” (Dear 
1995  p.  40)  Note  that  he  makes  no  mention  here  of  suitable  objects  of  study,  simply  of 
procedure, and then he proceeds along the same lines to say, “for they always proceed from the 
particular foreknown principles to the conclusions to be demonstrated, which is the proper duty 
and office of a doctrine or discipline, as Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, also testifies.”  (ibid.). 
This  shift  of  the  essential  definition of  science was a  strategy Clavius  deemed  likely to  be 
successful for the reclassification of mathematics and one he pursued.
As long as science was required to treat of the world, then the defenses of mathematics on the 
basis that it involved causation would be insufficient (though needed).  In Clavius' writings we 
read him complaining of those who claimed that mathematics was not science by virtue of it 
“not [having] demonstrations [and being] abstract from being and the good etc” (Monumenta 
Pedagogia  Societas  Jesu,  quoted  in  Dear,  1995.  p.  35.   Insertions  mine).   The  issue  of 
“demonstrations” is that of the proper scientific use of Aristotelian causation as discussed in 
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section 2.1.1.  The rest of the quote is what concerns us here.  The claim being made is that 
investigation of certain subjects (along with other requirements) is required of a science and that 
mathematics does not investigate those subjects.
These criticisms were based in the differences between 1s and 1m in 2.1.1 above.  The substance 
of the claim is that objects of mathematical enquiry are not objects at all, or at least not objects 
about  which  scientific  knowledge  can  be  had.   For  the  proponents  of  mathematics  to  be 
successful in redesignating it as a science that criticism would have to be confronted and shown 
at  least  uncompelling or ideally for them, untrue.   The mathematicians made no claims that 
mathematics directly studied physical objects in the world but they did deny that that was a 
necessary characteristic of science.  This could be done, as Clavius did, by claiming that other 
characteristics of science were more important, to the extent that the nature of the object was 
inessential,  or  at  least  that  the  object  being what  the  late  Scholastics  required it  to  be  was 
inessential,  or  as  Blancanus  did,  by  claiming  that  the  difference  between  objects  made  of 
sensible matter  and object made of intelligible matter  was not significant enough to make a 
difference to the scientific status of inquiries concerning them.
Clavius’ argument ran that the central goal of scientific enquiry was certain and incontrovertible 
truth and that any other description or definition of the scientific enterprise was inessential.  The 
sciences, he said, 
“delight in and honor Truth – so that they not only admit  nothing that is 
false, but indeed nothing that arises only with probability, and finally, they 
admit nothing that they do not confirm and strengthen by the most certain 
demonstrations – there must be no doubt that they must be conceded the first 
place  among  all  the  other  science”  (Opera Mathematica,  quoted  in  Dear 
1995 p.38)
and goes so far as to criticize the other sciences for their lack of certainty, saying that Ptolemy 
had described natural philosophy as “rather to be called conjectures than sciences, on account of 
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the multitude and discrepancy of opinions” (Dear 1995 p.38).  This is a reference to Ptolemy’s 
Almagest, in the preface of which he says that: 
…the other two genera of the theoretical [the physical and the theological] 
would be expounded in terms of conjecture rather than in terms of scientific 
understanding:  the  theological  because  it  is  in  no  way  phenomenal  and 
attainable, but the physical because its matter is unstable and obscure, so that 
for  this  reason  philosophers  could  never  hope  to  agree  on  them;  and 
meditating only on the mathematical, if approached enquiringly, would give 
its  practitioners  certain  and  trustworthy  knowledge  with  demonstration…
(Ptolemy 1952 pp5-6)
All of this indicates strongly that Clavius and those who similarly supported the inclusion of 
mathematics among the sciences were placing some emphasis on the relative consistency of 
opinion among mathematicians about the fundamental truths of their discipline.  This level of 
agreement being distinct from what they categorized as the relative plurality of views in natural 
philosophy,  mathematicians  like  Clavius  classed  themselves  and  their  field  above  the 
uncertainties of the other sciences.
There seem to be two factors contributing to the ability of the mathematicians to make these 
arguments.   The first  is the empirical success and practical advantage afforded to the mixed 
sciences  by their  use  of  mathematics  and  the  second is  the  relatively enviable  certainty of 
mathematical  demonstrations  within  the  pure  field.   The  empirical  successes  of  the  mixed 
sciences  are  nicely  exemplified  by  the  astronomical  work  of  Galileo  while  the  latter 
characteristic is related to the Renaissance and Early Modern idea of the object.
The empirical and practical successes of the mixed mathematical sciences are themselves further 
divisible into two areas.  The first is the enhanced ability of individual researchers to make 
inferences on the basis of the data available to them and the second is the ability of those 
researchers to make use of data collected by multiple individuals in a way that researchers in 
fields less dependent upon mathematics were unable to do.  The impact of both these benefits in 
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the late 16th and early 17th centuries is well illustrated by the advances in astronomy occurring at 
that time.  My selection of astronomy to illustrate the point should not indicate that such benefits 
are not observable in the other mixed sciences (see e.g. Dear, 1994, p. 51 for some discussion of 
geometrical optics in the 17th century), but rather that astronomy was the mixed mathematical 
science attracting the attention of the scientific, philosophical and mathematical communities 
because of the growth in the field spurred by, among other influences4, Galileo and his telescope.
Cabeo makes the point in his 17th century commentary on Aristotle’s Meteorology that 
astronomy cannot be done beyond a very basic level by one observer, but requires the 
accumulated experiences of astronomers across time and space (Dear 1994 pp93-94).  This may 
seem to fit with the Aristotelian idea of experience and evidence as that knowledge shared by, 
and available to, the community, and Cabeo himself does seem to have held this conservative 
view.  Collected astronomical knowledge however, especially as the field advanced at the end of 
the 16th century, did not follow that pattern of generally accessible knowledge; requiring as it did 
increasingly specialised expertise and resources.  This sort of knowledge was created by, and 
only meaningfully accessible to, specialists.  The creation of knowledge, and its addition to the 
astronomical corpus, had significant technical, technological and social barriers.  Key to this 
barrier is the distinction Blancanus made in has Sphaera Mundi between phenomena and 
observations.  Phenomena in his sense are those characteristic operations of the heavens that 
were accessible to and accepted by the general public as universal truths, as orthodox 
Aristotelian evidence (for example, the phases of the moon or the movement of the rising point 
of the sun from a given observation point on the Earth's surface through the year).  Observations 
on the other hand he defined, in a marked break with previous understandings of the terms (Dear 
1994 p48), as privileged knowledge, available only to observers with access to, for example, 
telescopes and with the mathematical skills needed to calculate speeds and relative sizes and 
motions of heavenly bodies on the basis of the data provided through the telescope.  A 
researcher also had to have the professional capital among other researchers to have their 
findings admitted to the common body of astronomical observations (Dear, 1994, p. 99). 
4 One other reason that astronomy was of such philosophical importance then and of such interest for this 
work was the theological importance of science as discussed in the previous chapter and the particularly 
pure knowledge of the divine supposedly available from study of the heavens, being more perfect that the 
Earth.
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Further development of astronomy would depend more and more on observations rather than 
phenomena (in accordance with Blancanus’ new definitions of the terms).  This development 
would prefigure the increasing reliance of all the sciences on specialized knowledge and 
individual expertise as their own advancement came to require more and more specialized types 
of observation.  
The successes afforded to astronomy (and the mixed sciences in general) by its use of 
mathematical methods certainly served to support Clavius’ claim of the reliability of 
mathematical demonstrations in general.  The other major support for his claim comes from the 
internal coherence and methodological reliability of Early Modern mathematics itself.  Its 
demonstrations were, in general, more reliable than the demonstrations and predictions of the 
natural sciences for reasons Dear (1992) deals with brieflyin his discussionof the distinctions 
between the thing being studied, the thing as it is present to the mind (the thing as object, or that 
which is present to the mind) and scientific knowledge about the thing as present to the mind.  In 
his discussion of the development of the term objective, Dear (1992) reminds us that the 
differences between these things were understood to be important in Early Modern science.  The 
distinction in mathematics however is very different to that in the other sciences.  Even with 
careful, lengthy and collaborative observations of a physical object there is a marked difference 
between the thing being investigated and the idea of the thing about which idea other things are 
known but this is far less the case with mathematical objects.  In an Aristotelian understanding 
they are present in the mind, in a Platonic understanding, present to the mind without the 
mediation of the senses.  So the thing and the object (thing as present to the mind (Dear, 1992)) 
are the same, or at least far closer than a physical thingis to a mental representation of it.  In 
1646, Honoré Fabri distinguished “objective” from “formal” certainty, the former being 
certainty of a proposition as a function of its nature, the latter a function of the mind actively 
granting assent to the proposition (Dear 1992, pp 622-623).  For mathematicians like Clavius 
and his followers, this gave them a distinct advantage over the other sciences in terms of the 
certainty of their demonstrations and conclusions.
2.2 In Conclusion
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In the previous chapter we looked at the relationship between the human and the divine in terms 
of rational knowledge.  The human and the divine share the characteristic of rationality, 
particularly of the ability to recognise logical and mathematical truths.  In this chapter we have 
discussed the changing status of mathematical understanding in the academic environment.  God 
and humanity were seen, as discussed in Chapter 1, as sharing specially in rationality and 
knowledge, in a manner that no other creation in the world shared and mathematics had become 
seen, through the efforts of the mathematicians, not only as a science, but as a science with 
special claims on certainty in knowledge and on truth.  Both of these would, in Early Modern 
Europe, go on to influence strongly the search for a certain science of swordsmanship, a science 
coherent with the bodies of knowledge describing humanity, the world and the divine.
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Chapter 3: Knowledge in Action
In  the  first  chapter  we  examined  some  Early  Modern  views  of  the  relationship  between 
humanity,  nature, the divine and rational knowledge.  In the second we looked at how some 
aspects of the idea of rational knowledge held by some philosophers changed in the late 16th and 
early  17th centuries  from  one  based  on  common  experience  to  one  based  on  specialised 
knowledge and observation by individuals possessing that knowledge.  We also examined how 
mathematics came to hold a place of prominence in academia as such a body of specialised 
expertise.   In  this  final  chapter  we  will  examine  Thibault’s  1630  Academie in  light  of  the 
preceding chapters and the commentary of de Ley, who devotes a chapter of his The Movement  
of Thought (1985) to Thibault.  Most of the philosophical foundations of the Academie are found 
in  the  first  chapter,  the  bulk  of  which is  found in  Appendix  A of  this  dissertation  both in 
transcription and my translation.  Where quotes from other parts of the book are needed, they 
will be taken from John Greer’s 2007 translation.  The first section of the chapter, from 3.1 to 
3.2.1 will offer a synopsis of the Academie, particularly those parts of it that will be discussed in 
the remainder of this chapter.
3.1 Publication of the Book
The  first  thing  we  will  be  considering  is  the  religious  content  of  the  opening  chapter  of 
Thibault’s  work.   This  book  received  publication  licences  from  Louis  XIII,  the  United 
Netherlands and Frederick II (Thibault 1630).  Of particular interest in this context is the one 
under  the  authority  of  the  Holy  Roman  Emperor.   Although  his  predecessor,  the  Emperor 
Matthias, was a religious peace-broker, Ferdinand was a powerful supporter of Catholicism, and 
this was expressed in his policies regarding printing and publishing.  For example,  after the 
suppression  of  the  protestant  rebellion  in  Bohemia,  all  books  had  to  be  passed  by a  Jesuit 
committee before printing and in accordance with an order dated April 1628, all privately owned 
books in the region had to be taken to the nearest priest for inspection and approval.  While 
Thibault was not writing within the Holy Roman Empire and he and the house of Elzevier were 
not subject to any of the specifically Holy Roman regulations of the publishing industry,  the 
presence of this authorisation in the book suggests that it was well in keeping with orthodox 
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Roman Catholicism.  The importance of religious orthodoxy in a book devoted to a physical and 
practical skill may not be immediately apparent to the 21st century reader but Thibault was not 
only offering practical advice, he was making truth claims about humanity and the world, and 
relying explicitly and implicitly on claims made by other writers about humanity and the world. 
Henri James Martin emphasises the importance of social mobility in creating a customer base for 
the  sort  of  self  help text  that  fencing manuals  were  (de Ley 1985).   Part  of  the process  of 
learning for these newly armed families and individuals was making sure that what was learned 
was socially and religiously orthodox.
In his analysis of censorship in Stuart England, Milton (1998), makes the point that the state was 
not in a practical position to effectively control publishing output by force, but the pressure for 
writers to submit themselves to the demands of the various stages of censorship, which in the 
English  system  he  describes  involved  approval  from the  diocese  and  the  Stationers’  Guild 
(Milton,  1998.  p  627), and  checking  of  previous  approvals  and  required  corrections  before 
printing.  Despite the lack of capacity of the government to enforce compliance, writers still 
went through the process.  Milton makes the argument that the point for the writers was not legal 
compliance, but the social capital of being seen as one of the approved spokesmen of orthodoxy. 
This is particularly relevant in Thibault’s case since, as a fencing instructor, he needed access to 
and respect from the socio-economic élite for his living.  It is also of importance for Thibault 
because the  warrant  for  the  truth  of  his  practical  claims  is  the  truth of  the  theological  and 
metaphysical  claims  in  his  first  chapter,  and  attestations  of  orthodoxy  in  turn  warranted 
confidence in those claims.
This  specifics  of  the  process  Milton describes  are  not,  of  course,  the  same  as  those of  the 
continent  but  the  principle  he  describes  is  instructive.   The  situation  on  the  continent  was 
complicated by the parallel power structures of Church and State, such complication not being as 
problematic in Anglican England.  Powis (1983) describes the difficulties by the French censors 
in walking the line between Catholic obedience and Gallic self-determination, and their solutions 
to them.  They pursued a policy whereby the authority to discipline the consciences of France 
was  vested  in  the  state,  specifically  in  the  king,  but  that  a  secure  state  required  orthodox 
Catholicism for the maintenance of public order. That degree of local  control  did not  imply 
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freedom  of  conscience,  but  national  sovereignty.  Thus  the  multiple  national  licenses  of 
publication should not  be  read as  having separate  requirements  for  religious  orthodoxy,  but 
rather as an assertion of national identity and, especially in the context of this book, an assurance 
of suitable social orthodoxy to European élites.
3.2 Content 
3.2.1 The Plates
The bulk of the book is comprised of explanations of the various plates1 (called Tabula I, Tabula 
II etc), each plate subdivided into smaller scenes, each designated by a number (Circle 1, Circle 
2 etc) and most of them (particularly from Tabula III onwards) capturing a moment in an armed 
encounter between two people.  These plates tend to depict detailed features iconic of the interior 
of a magnificent building, some of the individual circles are on the floor of this building, but 
others are painted on the walls or are on tapestries etc.  To my eyes and those of other modern 
readers I have consulted this does not seem particularly strange, but Thibault felt the need to 
insert an authorial note explaining it.  In this note he claims that the presence of images within 
images as  anything  other  than  representations  of  art  within  the  scenes  depicted was  not  a 
common thing in art at or before this time. In his explanation he assumes that the reader would 
not automatically interpret all the images as representations of three dimensional space but might 
rather interpret the picture of the room in three dimensions but the pictures in the room in two 
unless  informed  otherwise  making  specific  mention  of  “the  majority  of  people  who do not 
understand  perspective”  (Thibault,  1630,  see  Appendix  A,  p  75  of  this  work).   He  also 
specifically  makes  the  comparison  in  that  note  between  the  images  and  maps,  particularly 
nautical maps, emphasising their nature as two dimensional representations of real space.
Each design called a “circle” is in fact a complex diagram comprised of a square containing a 
circle and various chords to that circle and lines connecting intersections of the circle, square and 
chords.  This construction is explained in the first plate and the chapter associated with it.  The 
1 The team of engravers were some of the finest of the period, led by van de Pass the Younger (Anglo, 
2000. p 75)
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diameter is equal to the height of a person from the feet to the tip of a finger stretched up above 
the head and the rest of the lines are drawn from this circle, the square circumscribing it exactly 
and the rest of the lines constructed from it according to the procedure Thibault describes at the 
end of that chapter,  giving explicit  instructions for the physical  construction of such a circle 
using chalk, string and a sword.  The fact that the instructions are very physical and practical is 
of interest for this study and this will  be discussed later.  While each diagram is a complex 
construction containing several  shapes,  Thibault  calls  them circles  and clearly considers  the 
circle to be the defining characteristic of the diagrams, so I will continue to use that terminology.
The first two plates are slightly different to the rest, describing, not moments in an encounter, 
but the principles of the training system.  In the first plate, pictured below in figures 1 and 2, are 
shown five circles overlaid with the human body in various configurations.  Circle 1 had the 
body facing the reader, half in full and half just showing the skeleton and with 25 anatomical 
points indicated running from the top of the brow at A to the ankles at Z (and leaving out the 
letter J).  Circle 2 is the only one with no human body and merely details the names of all the 
lines in the figure (for example principal diameter, perpendicular diameter (both diagonal to the 
circumscribing  square),  oblique  diameters  (parallel  to  the  sides  of  the  square),  exterior 
transverses, exterior collaterals etc).2  Circle 3 shows a skeleton from the side and the circle has 
footprints on it showing the number of paces of Thibault’s favoured length along the diameter 
showing how each of those paces end with a foot on one of the intersections of the figure.  Circle 
4 shows the human body from behind, stretched along the primary diameter of the circle and 
with footprints  at points on the diagram showing the three categories of distance (3 Instances) 
between combatants in which different possible actions can be taken.  Circle 5 has a figure from 
the front,  but inverted with respect to the other figures on the page, it partners Circle 4 and 
details the types of attack possible in the three Instances (the three distance relationships detailed 
in  Circle  4).   There  are  then  several images  showing his preferred  length  of  sword3  and 
comparing it to various parts of the human body, this is an interesting example of the interplay 
between the empirical and rational contributions to his work, to which we shall return in section 
2 Diameter pricipalis, diameter perpendicularis, diameter obliqua, transversæ exteriors, collaterales  
exteriores
3 For which the distance from point to quillions (cross guard) equal to that from the navel to the soles of 
the feet, or half the diameter of the circle.
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3.2.2.3.  The second plate continues the anatomical theme with a comparison of the points on 
Plate 1, Circle 1 with the anatomical points and proportions found in Dürer’s Vier Bücher von 
Menschlicher Proportion (Book II p. 60).  Thirteen of these are shared between the systems, 
twelve are specific to Thibault, and Dürer has fifteen points on the body and four on the arm that 
Thibault does not (Thibault does not detail any points on the arm).  The third plate and onwards 
start to describe actions performed with the weapon in hand, which will not occupy much of our 
attention, so I will not describe the rest of the twenty three plates of the first book and thirteen of 
the second; the first  book detailing the actions of single sword against single sword and the 
second having two plates of astrological significance and then showing how the sword alone is 
to  be  used  against  sword  and  dagger,  sword  and  shield,  two  handed  sword,  left  handed 
swordsmen  and  firearms  (the  last  not  using  the  circles  to  describe  the  movements  of  the 
swordsman).
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Fig 1: Thibault's Tabula I.  Left half
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Fig 2: Thibault's Tabula I.  right half
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3.2.2 The Text and the Context
The plates are accompanied by text explaining their content.  This dissertation will focus on the 
text associated with Tabula I.
3.2.2.1 The History of Mathematics in Fencing
In the previous chapters we made much of the academic attitudes to mathematics in the period 
and this text combines some of those same attitudes with what we might describe as external 
(non-professional) esteem for mathematics.   This esteem can be seen in two different ways, 
esteem for mathematics as useful for description and esteem for mathematical laws as prior to 
and  determinant  of  the  behaviour  of  people  and  the  world.   Thibault  uses  mathematics 
descriptively but his writings begin with defining the human body and the universe in terms of 
their essential  (as he saw them) mathematical properties,  which he saw as the same as their 
theological properties.  
Man…exhibits…with  all  the  other  signs  of  divine  wisdom,  a  nice 
representation of the Universe in its entirety and its major parts…body has 
condensed within it not only that of the base Earth that we see, but also the 
heavens.  (Thibault 1630.  See Appendix A, pg 79 of this dissertation.)
The first text to make the connection between fencing and mathematics is reputed to be the lost 
book of Phillipo di Bartolomeo Bardi, professor of mathematics at the University of Bologna in 
the early fifteenth century whose first book dealt with geometry and whose second explained 
swordsmanship in terms of it (dei Liberi,  1902, p. 108, note 179).  That there was this link 
between fencing and mathematics was an idea that was to remain popular, but not always well 
understood or  explained  by those  who  espoused  it.   Filippo  Vadi,  for  example,  in  his  late 
fifteenth century treatise on personal combat claims that fencing is “a true science and not an 
art”4 because the sword is subject to geometry and is therefore like music “so geometry and 
music combine their scientific virtues in swordsmanship to adorn the bright star of Mars” (Vadi, 
4 “Che le scienza vera e nõ e arte” (3 verso)
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2002 pp 40-43) yet he never mentions mathematics again in his text.  This topos can be seen in 
several treatises on swordsmanship, but nowhere is more attention paid to it than in the treatises 
of the destreza tradition, this makes the destreza tradition a good case for an initial examination 
of the idea. 
3.2.2.2 Description and Descriptive Mathematics
The earliest surviving treatise on swordsmanship, dating from the first years of the 14th century 
has the combatants floating free in space.  It is impossible to tell which leg is forward and the 
weapons  and other items held change size from plate to plate5 as well as having no depth or 
angle (the plane of the blade is always parallel to the plane of the page).  Over the next three 
hundred years there would be significant developments in artistic technique that would allow the 
communication of significantly more information about depth and angle through perspective. 
This  primarily  involved  the  addition  of  a  line  or  other  features6 suggestive  of  the  ground. 
Modifications would be made to this in terms of the addition of regular tiles to the floor as 
Fabris (1606) did.   The next addition to this area of growth in the artistic representation of 
combative training would be Henri de Sainct Didier who, in 1573 added numbered footprints to 
his woodcuts.  Anglo (2000 p 65) calls Sainct Didier’s ground plans geometric but, while many 
of them do have the footprints connected to make polygons, calling it geometrical in the sense 
that we see geometry in Thibault is misleading as precise information about distance or angle 
cannot be determined, nor is it intended to be so, from the diagrams. 
Apart from the footwork, fencing instructors and writers and their artists also made progress 
over those three centuries in communicating movements of the arms and weapons.  The first 
major development was the ability to represent the sword which, although obviously a three 
dimensional  object,  may  be  represented  in  art  like  a  tilted  plane  in  terms  of  its  angle  and 
perspective in pictures.  In terms of geometrical description of its movements, the next great 
5 It is worth noting that the size change of the bucklers (small, fist gripped shields) do correspond to their 
orientation. The larger bucklers are always facing along an axis in the plane of the page (bucklers edge on 
to the reader) while the smaller ones at 90 degrees to it.  Thus it seems possible that this inconsistency is 
for improved visibility.
6 Hans Wieditz’ woodcuts for the 1531 Der Alten Fechter do not show a floor, but indicate it’s presence 
by the shadows the combatants cast
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innovation came in 1553 in the Tratatto di Scientia d’Arme, con un Dialogo di Folosofia by the 
architect  Camillo  Agrippa7.   Agrippa  described  the  fencing  lunge  using  geometrical 
constructions to demonstrate different angles of the leg and placements of the arms (Anglo 2000, 
p 63, plates 42 and 43).
It was Thibault who was to build on these communicative methods in a manner which, although 
clearly owing much to his predecessors, was truly novel.  When one examines the circles, the 
reader should note that Thibault explicitly compares his diagrams to maps and the idea of the 
map grid, both in his  authorial  note about  the plates and in his  discussion of the first  plate 
(Thibault, 2007. p 30), in the latter case specifically comparing them to marine charts.  The type 
of  marine  chart  to  which  Thibault's  diagrams  have  the  most  marked  resemblance  is  the 
Portuguese portolan charts of the 13th through 16th centuries.  These charts did not have a fixed 
square grid but a circular pattern with chords emanating from points around its circumference, 
the chords indicating, not fixed points, but distance and direction along a constant bearing from a 
starting point or a waypoint (Turnbull 1996, pp 9-10).  This has significant correspondence with 
Thibault’s use of the circle which indicates, not fixed points on the floor, but defines various 
angles of movement based on the starting points of the combatants.  The relevance of Thibault's 
use of bearing and of the portolan model is important when comparing the footwork diagrams of 
the  Academie to those of Henri de Sainct Didier8.  Sainct Didier's footprint diagrams indicate 
points to which the fencer must step in execution of certain actions just as Thibault's do, but 
there is a major difference in that Sainct Didier's footprints are simply presented as numbered 
points on the ground while Thibault  gives the rule for determining them based on the angle 
along which the fencer must step.  This was a novel development in fencing literature as well as 
a method specific to the portolan charting method.  Given that Thibault is explicit that he draws 
7 Agrippa was one of the engineers tasked with moving the Vatican obelisk in 1586 and can be assumed to 
have significant mathematical knowledge.  He also wrote on marine navigation, meteorology and 
geography.
8Author of the 1573 fencing text Traicté contenant les secrets du premier livre sur l’espée seule, mère de 
toutes armes, qui sont espée dague, cappe, targue, bouclier, rondelle, l’espée deux mains & deux espées,  
avec ses pourtraictures, ayans les armes au poing por se deffendre & offencer à un mesme temps des  
coups qu’on peut tirer, tant en assillant qu’en deffendent, fort utile & profitable por adextrer la noblesse,  
& suposts de Mars: redigé par art, ordre & practique 
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on maps as a communicative device, it is a reasonable assumption that he had some exposure to 
the portolan method.
Fig 3. Detail from Carte Pisante (c. 1290), the oldest known European sea chart.  Vellum, 50 X 
105 cm.  (Turnbull 1996, p 10)
Despite this affinity there are some problems in drawing too close an analogy with geographical 
maps.  According to Liben (2001, p 50), cartographic maps (as contrasted with conceptual or 
Peregrine Dace: Chapter 3 Page 54 25/03/2010
other  maps)  have  three  essential  characteristics,  purpose,  duality  (both  as  things  and  as 
representations of things) and spatialisation (it represents what it represents in relation to space). 
The problem with applying this analysis  of maps to Thibault’s circles is that the space they 
describe is defined by things not fixed with reference to one another as most cartographic maps 
are; landmarks, buildings, rivers in large scale maps etc.  Thibault's circles are defined only by 
the fencers,  who are observing both their own movement through the environment and their 
opponent’s movement with respect to themselves and the environment,  in which each action 
must take place in a given place with resepct to the opponent.  One might compare this with a 
naval chart prepared as the ship moves and drawn with other ships as reference points.  Useless 
for a ship trying to navigate reefs, but it may be described with a simile not available to Thibault 
as being like a radar display, which is optimised for informing actions in a dynamic environment 
involving other agents.  
Thibault  draws  on  a  number  of  knowledge  traditions  in  developing  his  system of  notation, 
particularly the mapmaking tradition of Iberia  which  used the radial presentation of direction 
from starting  points  around  a  circle and the  fencing  tradition  which  had  started  to  depict 
footprints  to  indicate  footwork  (such  as  in  Sainct  Didier's  work)  and  the  use  of  geometric 
construction lines to indicate movements of the blade (for example in the work of Agrippa).   All 
of these developments are to be found in Thibault’s  Academie with modifications; the lines of 
direction and distance are calculated not from fixed starting points but from the mobile fencer, 
the footprints were used before but Thibault presents them with precise distance and direction 
from the starting position of  the feet  to  intersections of  the lines  of  the diagram and while 
Thibault does not often show construction lines around the blade (beyond his demonstration of 
the range of motion of the blade in Tabula I), he explicitly communicates their positions in terms 
of the grid of lines on the ground by showing their shadows in a novel fashion for fencing, or 
any other,  Early Modern  instructional treatises.  In this text Thibault far surpasses the visual 
clarity of his master’s or his master’s books (Anglo 2000).  While both of them had geometrical 
diagrams to express principles of space and distance, neither of them used those diagrams to 
develop anything  like  a  consistent  notation for  communicating precise  motions  and actions. 
This is the first time in the surviving 300 years of texts on fencing, that they or texts on sports or 
dance contain the amount of information and precision of information that Thibault's work does. 
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Turnbull  (1996  pp4-60)  points  out  the  importance  of  information-rich,  copyable  and 
interpretable  diagrams  in  the  development  of  early  modern  and  modern  science,  and  the 
developments in movement notation made by Thibault and the other fencing writers points to a 
spread of use of these diagrams and development of techniques in this sort of communication 
well outside the academic zone. 
This  idea  of  information  rich  diagrams  suggests  some  of  the  importance  and  interest  in 
Thibault’s use of descriptive geometry.   The lavish buildings in which the individual pairs of 
figures are depicted make it tempting and easy for readers such as Castle in the 19th century 
(Castle, 2003) to think of them as naturalistic depictions of pairs of swordsmen but this is far 
from  the  truth,  even  an  obstacle  to  understanding  them.  One  must  look  carefully  to  see 
indications that the images are not intended to be naturalistic representations but the clues are 
there, the first is contained in the text with his use of the comparison of the plates and the circles 
to maps, not naturalistic pictures, and the second is the use of shadow in the plates, the shadows 
of  the  fencers are  angled as  if  the light  source was off  the  reader’s  left  shoulder while the 
shadows of the swords are placed as if there were a far brighter light directly overhead; where 
naturalism conflicts with precise  communication,  Thibault  makes  the  former  give  way.  The 
diagrams  are  attempts,  not  to  depict  scenes  of  combat  or  training,  but  to  communicate 
information about of space and movement to the reader.  Some training schools may have made 
use of them, for example there is a woodcut of the fencing school at the University of Leuven in 
the late 16th century which shows such a floor pattern9  but Thibault makes clear in his text that 
they are purely aids to the reader's, and student's understanding, but do not depict a real place.
3.2.2.3 Mathematics as constitutive
Thibault’s diagrams are intended as communicative devices but their import goes beyond that, 
they do not simply provide a framework for the space in which movements take place and allow 
those  movements  to  be  described,  but  they  are  claimed  to  indicate  what  the  appropriate 
movements are.  Each step ends exactly on a vertex, not only to show where it is, but because 
9That school had been instructed by Ludolf Van Culen, Professor of Mathematics there, but I cannot 
definitively attribute the floor pattern to him.
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Thibault claims that the laws of mathematics made the vertices the best places to step prior to the 
his empirical successes using that method.  The reasons for this are what most strongly relate 
Thibault’s work to the Similarity Thesis of the first chapter and the position of mathematics in 
relation to it as described in the second chapter.  In practice these steps, being comparatively 
short, more closely approximate the normal walking and pace and normal standing position than 
the  relatively  longer  steps  and  lunges  and  the  pitched  body  positions  taught  by  many  of 
Thibault’s  professional  competitors.   In  his  introduction,  Thibault  talks  about  the  standing 
posture  as  best  for  fencers  because  it  is  natural  to  humanity  and  that  other  postures  are 
“repugnant  to  the  ordinary way of  walking or  standing:  the  effect  of  this  is  that  instead of 
displaying great courage, they inconvenience themselves and reduce their own power” (p. 84 of 
this dissertation).  This still does not justify his claims on anything other than pragmatic grounds, 
movements to which the body is used, or which the body performs more efficiently may well 
prove  more  successful  without  having  direct  relevance  to  metaphysical  concerns  or  the 
relationship of theological to practical truths.   He takes what he requires for this extra leap from 
other areas of the Similarity Thesis to convince the reader of that relationship.  These are, firstly 
that  humanity is  uniquely similar  to God,  secondly that  the universe necessarily reflects  the 
nature of God.  These together would give the human a special place in the universe and would 
give actions that specially characterize the human such as reason, science, art and technology a 
special role in defining and upholding that place; both the human mind in terms of its rationality 
and the human form in terms of its “most naturally human” postures and movements.
The most rational human mental activity having been seen as the mathematical, Thibault must 
then demonstrate “natural” similarities between the human body and the divine plan,  and in 
particular between his method and the divine plan.  He attempts this, apparently succeeding to 
his own satisfaction, in the Explanation of the First Plate10 (see Appendix A, p. 77 et seq.).  This 
is the section where he most explicitly compares the human form to the universe, and to the 
theologia prisca of the neo-Platonists, here explicitly making reference to Pythagoras and Plato. 
Here, not only is the form itself holy, but knowledge of the form and its proper functions makes 
one holy.  Where he compares the body to the Ark and the temple of Solomon, for example he 
implicitly  makes  improper  movement  or  use  of  the  body  a  misuse  of  divine  gifts.   This 
10 Declaration du Tableau Premier
Peregrine Dace: Chapter 3 Page 57 25/03/2010
comparison is analogical, Thibault analogises the body to both the heavens and to the parts of 
buildings, the legs to pillars, the proportional dimensions to those of Noah's Ark.  Thibault thus 
presents us with a curious mix; a Early Modern, scientific sensibility geometrically mapping the 
ranges of movements of joints and overall movement possibilities but justified by reference to 
neo-Platonic imagery and anology.
Herbert de Ley (1985) discusses the shift from one Foucauldian  episteme (one of analogy) to 
another (one of quantification and classification) in the late 16th and the 17th century in France, 
specifically using a comparison of Henri de Sainct Didier’s and Thibault’s works as illustrative 
of this shift, classing the former as falling largely within the episteme of resemblance or analogy, 
as evidenced by the generally metaphorical  language used,  and the latter  in the  episteme of 
classification based upon its use of geometrical description.  He does acknowledge that Thibault 
uses the language of analogy in places, particularly in Thibault's  opening comparison of the 
human body and the universe and in his later comparison of the interplay of sword combat with 
the give and take of juridical argument (de Ley, 1985. p. 59).  He uses these comparisons to 
situate  Thibault’s  work  within  this  epistemic  shift  from  the  “analogical”  to  the  “logical”, 
including elements of  the old even as it  is  exemplary of the new.  Although he admits that 
Thibault does include elements of the analogical, he does not see the mathematical (for him 
logical and classifying) elements as dependent upon the analogical, though he does not explain 
why he sees them as separate.  He simply states that the analogies of, for example the human 
body to  the  planets  in  the  introduction are  separate  from the logical  elements,  for  example 
Thibault's desire to reduce “infinite operations” to a few laws applicable across all (ibid. p. 63).
The logical and analogical parts of the work can be considered separately and certainly one 
could develop a model of physical conflict without his premises, but to ascribe this thinking to 
Thibault and his readers would be anachronistic.  Thibault begins his book with a comparison of 
the human body with the universe and with the divine, adopting alchemical  and astrological 
language to express the affinity of  not only the human body in particular, but  also  the human 
more generally, with the greater creation and claiming that that affinity is to be seen most easily 
in numerical and geometrical terms.  This combination of neo-Platonic, analogical elements with 
the  mathematising,  quantifying  elements  that  de Ley identifies  as characteristic  of  the  "new 
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episteme of 1605" (ibid. p. 55) are important to understanding Thibault's work and its place in 
Early Modern intellectual history.  Thibault justifies the one with reference to the other, saying:
Man…exhibits  with  all  the  other  signs  of  divine  wisdom,   a  nice 
representation of the entire Universe and its major parts, and has this with 
some justification been called by the philosophers of old Microcosm, or the 
Little World
…
[the body has] condensed within it not only that of the base Earth that we 
see, but also the heavens; thus mirroring the totality with harmony,  beauty 
and completeness, and with the proper consistence/coherence of numbers, 
measurements  and  weights,  which  correspond/reference  marvellously  the 
properties of the four elements and the effects of the planets, there is no other 
with this resemblance.  The most perfect number, Ten, is constantly to be 
seen before our eyes, in full with our full complement of fingers; & divided 
into two even parts between the two hands, divided into the number of five 
digits which are divided unequally between the thumb and the other digits 
into one and four, where the One is composed of two sections and the Four 
of three11: thus the entire structure contains and comprises the primary and 
most excellent numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, which many of the most famous 
philosophers, like Pythagoras, Plato and those of the learned Schools held in 
the  highest  esteem,  and  used  to  both  conceal  and  reveal  the  greatest 
mysteries of  their doctrines. (Thibault  1630, Book I Tableau I,  p.  1) (see 
Appendix A, p 77)
This may seem a philosophically strange expression, seeing excellence (and not mere usefulness 
or normality) in, for example the number ten as something independent of our number of fingers 
and a mark of the excellence of the body.  The explanation for this can be found in the Similarity 
Thesis and the related idea of the Book of Nature.  If, as was an important idea in European 
thought  at  the  time,  the  causal  similarity  principle  applied  to  humans  and  the  universe  as 
11 Likely the joints of the fingers.
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creations of  God,  then affinities  and similarities  should be present.   Likewise if  the  special 
quality shared by human and divine was in terms of people’s ability to perceive and understand 
the  nature  of  the  universe  and  themselves,  then  that  similarity  should  be  both  evident  and 
understandable  by  the  educated  of  the  time,  that  is,  scientifically  understandable.   In 
understanding the universe, people could understand God, themselves and qualities shared by 
them, particularly order and rational understanding.
It should not be strange to us to find a slightly self pleading streak in a text exhibiting elements 
of the Similarity Thesis but it would be overly simplistic to call it simply a fashioning of the 
universe in the image of humanity.  Thibault certainly seems to believe that the human body, the 
world and the heavens all conform to the same pattern and that that pattern has primacy over the 
vagaries of the human body.  For example, in the discussion of Tabula II, in which Thibault’s set 
of human proportions are compared to Dürer’s, Thibault says that where the two systems differ 
“it is the circle which will settle the question” (Thibault 2007, p. 40).  Deciding between two 
systems on the basis of one of them is, of course, problematic but beyond that what is interesting 
is that it is to the circle, to the rules, that Thibault appeals rather than to the body itself.  He also 
seems to feel that determining the proportions from a picture of the body or from the body itself 
(as Dürer did) is an inferior method to one based on the application of simple rules, calling 
Dürer’s  parallelograms  “artificially ordered”12 whereas  the  lines  and  vertices  that  define  his 
circular system fall as where they may13 based on the rules he has established for drawing the 
diagram.  He then corrects the length of the hand in Dürer’s system because it should be shorter 
because “according to the demonstration of the Circle… its length should be no more than the 
length of the head, which is equal to half the side of the quadrangle” (Thibault 2007, p. 41).  At 
points  where Thibault  corrects  Dürer,  e.g.  the  ratio  of  thigh to  shin and the  position of the 
buttocks,  he  does  not  explicitly  say  whether  he  is  doing  so  on  the  basis  of  empiricism or 
rationalism but the claim about the hand is clearly on the basis that Dürer’s proportion does not 
correspond to the rule and that those rules are what Dürer ought to have followed.  This claim is 
an embrace of the mathematisation  that  de Ley (1985) claimed as characteristic  of  the new 
episteme and that Dear (1995) identified as part of the shifting ideas of the nature of science at 
12 artificiellement ordoneés (Thibault, 1630 Book I, Tableau II p. 2)
13 quasi à l’adventure (Thibault, 1630 Book I, Tableau II p. 2)
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the time, rejecting individual observations for mathematical rules.  Thibault however does not 
justify his rules inductively, but by reference to implicitly neo-Platonic ideals.
For Dear (1995) this mathematisation is accompanied, and is required for, the production of 
evidence from discrete observations and data but this does not seem entirely to be the case in 
Thibault’s  work.   The notional  body that  Thibault  uses in his  circle is  defined as the ideal, 
“perfectly proportioned” body and his claim is that other systems, such as Dürer's are a result of 
getting evidence from bodies that are “poorly proportioned” (Thibault 2007, p. 41).  So the best 
knowledge  about  the  body and  its  construction  comes  not  from gathering  knowledge  from 
several bodies and mathematically determining the 'standard body'  but by selecting the ideal 
body based upon the rules already geometrically determined.  Part of the distinction that exists 
between the two types of mathematisation, one turning individual data into public evidence and 
the other defining what is acceptable as evidence based upon its conformity to pre-established 
mathematical rules, may be understood from Thibault's title.  He uses the phrase “demonstrated 
by means of mathematical rules”14 in his titular announcement of the method he will be using. 
Since he is distinctly using a geometrical method, this is perhaps not surprising, but the phrase 
Reigles Mathematiques has connotations in French that go beyond that.  The earliest use of the 
phrase that I’ve been able to find, and one that was translated under the guidance of the Royal 
Society’s editors at the time of its publication, is by de Luc (1778, pp. 545-546) who says,
We are obliged to take up with probability in Nature in so many respects, 
that it is perhaps of more importance to us to investigate the physical rules of 
probability than to attend to its mathematical rules upon hypotheses.
Nous sommes obliges de nous contenter du probable à tant d’égards dans la 
Nature, que chercher lès règles mathématiques sur des hypotheses.
This  quote  is  from the  late  18th century  and  is  more  sympathetic  towards  the  inclusion  of 
probability and uncertainty in scientific investigation than an early 17th century scientist would 
be but the distinction he makes is clear.  Measurable instances are subject to the vagaries of 
14Demonstrent par Reigles Mathematiques (Thibault, 1630)
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probability, or uncertainty, but rational mathematical rules are not.  According to Hacking (1995, 
p. 22 et seq.), the Thomist view separated probability from science on the basis that probability 
is a function of opinion and approbation, etymologically related to probity (Byrne 1968, p. 188 
in  Hacking  1995,  p.  23),  while  scientific  demonstration  provided a  far  higher  standard  of 
evidence and promised knowledge rather than opinion.  So mathematics would fit the bill for 
certainty after Clavuis’ claim that mathematics and mathematicians… 
“delight in and honor Truth – so that they not only admit nothing that is false, 
but indeed nothing that arises only with probability, and finally, they admit 
nothing  that  they  do  not  confirm  and  strengthen  by  the  most  certain 
demonstrations – there must be no doubt that they must be conceded the first 
place among all the other science” (Opera Mathematica, quoted in Dear 1995 
p.38)
It is also in this context that the relatively higher status of mathematics in terms of the other 
sciences has a slightly longer currency than Dear (1995) argues.  The fifteenth century quote 
from Vadi cited above suggests that outside of the schools, mathematics was considered and 
exemplary science and of sufficient status to warrant  the association Vadi  clearly wanted to 
make between his art and the sciences.
With the  fencers'  opponent  already being unpredictable  and  knowledge  of  possibly variable 
success with their defences, the embracing of certainty and rejection of chance in at least their 
own  techniques  is  something  readily  desirable  by  many  swordsmen  who  understood  the 
difficulties and uncertainties inherent in a sudden encounter, an uncertainty tacitly admitted to by 
Thibault (2007, p. 57) even though mathematical certainty is the basis of his system of training. 
Given the promise of certainty that science offered and the claims from within the academic 
community by writers such as Clavius and his followers that mathematics was not only a science 
but the science of greatest certainty then the intellectual path Thibault and his predecessors took 
become clear.  Mathematics allowed them to reduce the number of possible situations to a few 
and describe their essential properties, showing 
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“one or two examples; so that according to them, and following the same 
method  one  is  able  to  counter  thousand or  more  other  operations,  which 
differ only in circumstances and in no way prevent the counter from having 
effect.” (Thibault, Greer (tr), 2007, p. 239)
So  the  essential  properties  of  the  attacks  were  identified  mathematically  and  their  certain 
counters determined according to the “mathematical rules” that promised so much.
3.3 In conclusion
Thibault  very clearly believes that  philosophy and mathematics  are  important  and that  they 
afford himboth intellectual access to the greatest available truth and professional access to his 
preferred clientelle.  
Thibault’s  Academie provides  insight  into  interactions  between  academic  philosophy  and 
society, represented by the socio-economic elite, in the Early Modern period.  The book was 
written for  　members of this elite and calculated to appeal to them, as well as present the 
author’s thesis.  In making the book appealing in this way, Thibault needed to promise that his 
method was socially orthodox and would offer the reader (who would also potentially provide 
Thibault  with further income as a student)  comparatively certain success compared to other 
teachers’ methods.
Intellectual orthodoxy and practical success were promised using the same method; appeal to the 
philosophical tradition.  Thibault drew on the elements of that tradition that promised that the 
practicalities of his practice (fencing) were governed by the same laws that governed the natural 
world.  That world was seen as an orderly and structured one, the creation of a rational deity.  
This deity imbued the world and humanity with elements of its own nature by virtue of the 
casual similarity doctrine.  Knowledge of the laws governing the world would therefore provide 
information about the laws governing the physical interactions of fencing agents.  He further 
believed that applying a full understanding of those laws would result in a greater chance of 
victory and  or  survival  than  a  purely empirically  derived  training  system.   Changes  in  the 
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sciences were enhancing the status of mathematics as a science and as a truth seeking discipline. 
Mathematics as science, as opposed to mathematics as methodological tool, offered both the 
perceived  precision  of  mathematics  with  the  insight  into  the  world  that  its  scientific  status 
promised.   These  were  presumed  to  be  of  benefit  to  fencers  in  that  by  understanding  the 
properties of  the objects,  bodies and swords,  being a manipulated in space,  better  decisions 
could be made and more desirable outcomes ensured.  
The  best  way  to  understand  those  movements  and  manipulations  was  seen  as  being 
mathematics, with its record of success in analysing movement of heavenly and earthly bodies. 
Its new status promised to the 16th century mind that the knowledge that was being produced by 
this approach was not merely a predictive model, but was true and about the world, and that 
these same truths applied to the divine and material worlds.  The appeal to philosophers and 
scientists in the Western tradition was a further promise to the reader of the correctness of the 
theoretical  background  of  the  system  and  an  assertion  of  the  appropriateness  of  a  highly 
rationalist approach to the development and pedagogy of a body of fencing knowledge (and by 
extension any praxis).
De  Ley’s  study of  Thibault  interprets  this  appeal  as,  not  unfailingly,  but  fundamentally  an 
appeal to the modern (according to de Ley) mode of quantifying events, situations or possibilites 
to  understand  them  and  describing  them  mathematically.   Thibault’s  writing  certainly 
demonstrates that he had accepted that mathematics was key to understanding the universe in a 
scientific fashion as the proponents of mathematics described in the second chapter desired. 
However  I  think  de  Ley underestimates  Thibualts  commitments  to  neo-Platonic  qualitative 
thinking; the analogising tendency from which he claims Thibault makes a clear break to situate 
himself on the opposite side of the ancient/modern divide.  Thibault’s explicit appeals to the 
prisca theologia in his opening chapter make de Ley’s strong position untenable.  
The use of non-academic sources like Thibault emphasises to us that the influence of philosophy 
on society does  not  follow the realtively clean  “party lines”  that  de  Ley suggests  and  that 
Thibault  in particular straddles the divide without apparently seeing any contradiction in his 
position.
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3.4 Areas of potential further study
This work has demonstrated some of the philosophical content of Thibault's work but there is 
space for further research into Thibault and into the writings of other martial arts masters of pre-
modern Europe.  Given Thibault's use of the human form, it may be fruitful to examine other 
masters'  understandings of  anatomy and optics  (something commented  on by a  few  fencing 
writers) to see how widely  and  swiftly changes in academic consensus penetrated the public 
sphere.   Likewise the importance on mathematics  to the other masters,  although mostly less 
explicit that in l’Academie is worth discussing, particuarly with reference to the importance of 
first  causes in the works of Carranza (Anglo, 2000, p. 67)   Also of potential interest is the 
relationship between class, state sanctioned military or civil violence and the personal violence 
that is the subject of the pedagogical systems described in the masters'  texts.  The occasions 
where Thibault offers to his reader practical and physical instructions in, for example, laying out 
the  circle  with  string  and  a  peg  and  his  use  of  the  word  Esquierre in  his  note  about  the 
illustrations which I have translated as grid but has connotations in 17th century French of a 
carpenter’s  set  square15,  invite  comparison  to  the  place  and  status  of  artisanal  skills  in  the 
development of experimental science that Dear (1995) discusses.
15 A set of instructions particularly de Selbyesque in its baroque precision.
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Appendix A:
Transcription and translation of the first part of
Thibault G (1630). Academie de l’espée de Girard Thibault d’Anvers ou se demonstrent par 
reigle mathematiques sur le fondement d’un cercle mysterieux la theorie et pratique de 
vrais et iusqu a present icognus secrets du maniement des armes a pied et a cheval; 
Elzevier, Leiden
This appendix was transcribed by me from a photocopy provided by the British Library of the 
copy in their collection or from other texts where noted.  The translations are by me unless 
otherwise noted.
Notes on translation:
As far as my abilities have allowed, I have stuck as closely to the original language as possible 
in this translation.  A ‘freer’ translation would read more smoothly in the English, but I did not 
want to create the illusion of proximity between writer and reader.  The slight stiltedness in the 
expressions, and the maintenance of the original (and unusual to most modern readers) 
punctuation is intended to serve as a reminder that there is a linguistic and temporal distance 
between the modern English and the 17th c. French.  
One change that has been made is that there are, at times, paragraph breaks in the English that 
are absent in the French.  This was to keep the parallel columns as close to synchronised as 
possible.  All footnotes attached to the French text are my own insertion to clarify references 
made by Thibault.
Since completion of this translation, a freer translation has been published as 
Thibault G, Greer J (trans) (2007) Academy of the Sword. Chivalry Bookshelf, Texas, to which 
the reader is directed for another view of the text.  Consulting that publication has served to 
increase my confidence in my own translation but there are a few differences in our 
interpretation of the text.  My translation of the note concerning the figures (on the third and 
fourth pages of this appendix) has undergone substantial revision in light of this publication. 
This translation goes up to page four of the original, including the theoretical basis of his 
method, but stopping at the point where Thibault will begin to give instructions for laying out 
the circle using lines and compass drawn curves to construct it as a geometrical diagram.
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Academie de l’espée de Girard Thibault 
d’Anvers ou se demonstrent par reigle 
mathematiques sur le fondement d’un 
cercle mysterieux la thoerie et pratique 
de vrais et iusqu a present icognus 
secrets du maniement des armes a pied 
et a cheval.
<Latin praises of Thibault>
Alius Applausus 
Super eodem Opere
Noliblis Viri Gabrielis von Danuf.
Salvatoris eram quondam admirator & 
ipse, cum gladiatoriis luderet ille modis; 
en reputans toties, anne hic perdificto 
quædam est?
Mars mihi Censor eris vel age testis 
eris.
Error: Quin dicam? Rumpantur ut illa 
Marti in Salvatore, Pallade Mars caruit.
An Caruit? Caruit. Num plane? 
Ignoscite dicam sitque auris verbis 
vesra adaperta meis: Salvator, 
gladiatorum clarissime quondam, Mars 
permulta ribi, ast pauca Minerva dedit:
Ponderis, & Numeri, Mensuræ & 
Temporis (usum (Artis opus:) Prudens 
none Minerva negat?
Horum Invenorem mango celebramus 
honore Thibauldum, cuivos, puto, 
cuncta dedistis, quæ artem hanc 
absolvunt, condecorantque simul.
Magnus Salvator, major Thibautius ille 
Cui Mars nulla negat, cuncta Minerva 
tulit.
Hinc Palladi, hinc Marti, herois simul 
omnibus issthinc, regibus hinc charus 
principibusque viris.
The School of the sword of Girard 
Thibault of Antwerp in which is shown 
by means of mathematical rules based 
on a mysterious circle the theory and 
practice of the true and currently 
unknown secrets of the used of weapons 
on foot and on horseback.
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Amy Lecteur, n’attendez pas que par 
quelque longue preface on vouz 
reccomande l’entreprinse, les peines & 
depense excessive que l’Auteur à employé 
en ce grand & precieux ouvrage; Les 
Preinces & Seigneurs à qui il l’a de dié, de 
qui on voit à l’entrée d’iceluy les armories, 
sont  ceux qu’on prent en tesmoins des 
admirables preuves & effects qu’il à donné 
en leur presence de l’Excellence de l’art 
qu’il y enseigne, qui pourtant l’ont eu en 
grande estime & l’ont honorè en plusieurs 
endroits de leut faveur & beineveullance & 
pouffé a en donner part a la posterité.
<Privileges of publication>
Advertissement sur la consideration des 
Figures de ce livre.
Pource que le spectateur trouveroit 
estrange, que plusieurs Images ne sont 
fixement poseés sur le fondement, tant au 
dessus qu’au dessoubs de l’Horison: nous 
avons trouvé bon de le’advertir, qu’il les 
faut concevoit comme estant despeinte aux 
muraille; ce la estant fait à cause des 
Cercles inegaux tant dessus de l’Horison 
que sur le plan, pour la representation plus 
commode de la doctrine, & pour 
l’intelligence plus facile du commun qui 
n’entende les perspectives: ainsi au 
Tableau 3. au dessus d’un & d’autre costé 
sont despients 4. homes aux parois, & en la 
Table 5. il y à quatre pieces en forme de 
peinture au milieu de la muraille ou 
massonnerie, desquels Cercles chascun 
suffit pour soy, & es Tables 6. 16. 21. 22. 
25. & 28. au milieu des toilles peinturées, 
& au costez sont despeintes à la paroy, es 
Tables 7. & 27. faut entendre que cela est 
fait en forme de chartes & en la Table 19. 
un tapi tendu ou pendu au milieu, dans 
lesquel les doctrines sont tissues, & es 
Tables 5. 8. 14. 17. 18. 20. 22. 25. 26. 27. 
28. 29. de mesme despient aux murailles, 
mais les premieres pieces se demonstrent 
plus viviment sur le fond ou base que les 
autres, car la se voit la façon des accordes 
Dear Reader, do not expect a long 
foreword in which the work is commended 
to you, the excessive toil and expense to 
the author described in this great and 
precious work.  The Princes and Lords 
whom it concerns, those ones seen 
practicing with weapons, are those whose 
testimony is admirable evidence of the 
excellence of the effects of the art taught in 
their presence which, although it is held in 
great honour must nevertheless have a part 
left through kindness and benevolence to 
posterity.
Privileges of publication from the Holy 
Roman Emperor Ferdinand II dated 1630, 
Louis XIII of France dated 1620 and the 
United Netherlands dated 1627.  
Note concerning the figures in this book
Some viewers find it strange that many 
images are not fixed to the ground but can 
be above as well as on the horizon: we 
thought it good to advise that you should 
conceive of them as painted on the walls; 
this has been done in order that some 
circles can be above the horizon as well as 
on the ground, for the more commodious 
representation of our teachings, and for the 
ease of understanding of the majority of 
people who do not understand perspective: 
also in Figure 3 on the tops of both sides 
are depicted 4 men on the walls, and in 
Figure 5 there are four pictures in the form 
of paintings in the middle of the wall of 
stone, which circles are enough for 
anyone., and on figures 6, 16, 21, 22, 25 
and 28 in the middle are painted cloths, 
and on the sides, some images are painted, 
in Figures 7 & 27, it is intended that they 
be in the form of maps, & in Figure 19 a 
tapestry hangs in the middle in which the 
teachings are woven, and in Figures 5, 8, 
14, 17, 18, 20, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 
similar depictions are on the walls but the 
primary images are shown in a more 
lifelike manner on the ground in front of 
the others, because agreement can be seen 
between the  
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Des espées & leur operation par les lignes 
du Cercle; pour ce que en forme 
d’Esquierre de la ligne Inferieur ou base, 
on trouve un accor des lame, fait au fond 
ou Cercle, par lequel, le jugement des 
operations mouvantes des espees que les 
figures tiennent en main, est rendu tres-
facile.
directions of the swords and their actions 
and the lines of the circle; by means of the 
grid down on the ground one can find 
agreement of the blades, with the circle on 
the ground by which the judgement of the 
movement of the blades the figures hold in 
hand is made very easy.
Peregrine Dace: Appendix A Page 79 25/03/2010
Declaration du Tableau Premier
Contenant
Les proportions du corps de l’homme, 
rapportées à la figure de nostre Cercle, & à 
la iuste longueur de l  ’Espee.  
Discours de l’excellence & perfection d  e   
l’homme, declarant que son corps est 
exactement compasse par Nombres, Poids, 
& Mesures, ayant des mouvements qui se 
rapportent à la figure Circulaire.
L’Homme est la plus parfaite & la plus 
excellente de toutes les Creatures du 
Monde; auquel se trouve, parmy les autres 
marques de la sagesse devine, une si 
exquise representation de tout l’Univers, 
en son entire & en les prencipales parties, 
qu il en a esté appellé à bon droit par les 
anciens Philosophes Microsocme, c’est à 
dire, le Petit Monde.  Car outré la dignité 
de l’ame, qui a tant d’avantages pas dessus 
tout ce qui est perissable, son corps 
contient un abbregé, non seulement de tout 
ce qu’on voit icy bas en terre, mais encores 
de ce qui est au Ciel mesme; representant 
le tout avec harmonie, si douce, belle, & 
entiere, & avec une si  juste contvenance 
des Nombres, Mesures, & Poids, qui se 
rapportent si merveilleusement aux vertus 
des Quatre Elements, & aux influences des 
Planetes, qui’il ne s’en trouve nulle autre 
semblable.  Le tres-parfait nombre de Dix 
luy est continuellement representé devant 
les yeux, en son entier sur ses propres 
doigts; & dereches en deux moitiez egales 
sur ses deux mains, à chascune par le 
nombre de Cinque doigts qui son dereches 
partis inegalement par les poulce, & par le 
reste an Un & Quatre, don’t l’Un est 
compose de Deux articles, & les Quatres 
des Trois: de façon que ceste structure luy 
met tousiours en veuë les premieres & plus 
excellents Nombres 1. 2. 3. 4. 5 .10. dont 
tant d’Illustres Philosophes, comme 
Pythagoras, & Platon, & tout ceux de 
leaurs Escholse, ont fait tant d’estime, 
qu’ils y ont voulu cacher, & en deduir les 
plus grands mysteres de leur doctrine.  En 
outré on voit aussi en 
Explanation of the First Plate
Containing
The proportions of the human body in 
terms of our circle and the appropriate 
length of the sword.
Discourse on the excellence and perfection 
of man, describing his body with exact 
numbers, weights and measures and having 
motions referable to the circular figure.
Man is the most wondrous and excellent of 
the creations of the world; and exhibits 
with all the other signs of divine wisdom, 
a nice representation of the Universe in its 
entirety and its major parts, and has thus 
with some justification been called by the 
philosophers of old Microcosm, or the 
Little World.  With all the dignity of the 
Soul, which has many desirable 
characteristics above all that is transient, 
the body has condensed within it not only 
that of the base Earth that we see, but also 
the heavens; thus mirroring the totality 
with a harmony so beautiful and complete, 
and with the complete coherence of 
numbers, measurements and weights, 
which correspond/reference marvellously 
the virtues of the four elements and the 
effects of the planets, there is no other with 
this resemblance.  The most perfect 
number, Ten, is constantly to be seen 
before one’s eyes, in full with our full 
complement of fingers; & divided into two 
even parts between the two hands, divided 
into the number of five digits which are 
divided unequally between the thumb and 
the other digits into one and four, where 
the One is composed of two sections and 
the Four of Three1: thus the entire structure 
contains and comprises the primary and 
most excellent numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 
which many of the most famous 
philosophers, like Pythagoras, Plato and 
those of the learned Schools held in the 
highest esteem, and used to both conceal 
and reveal the greatest mysteries of their 
doctrines.  Also, one sees in the length, la 
1 Likely the joints of the fingers.
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longueur, largeur, & espesseur de ce 
mesme corps, que les mesures y sont si 
justement observées que les plus grands 
Architectes Anciens & Modernes n’ont 
sceu choisir  aucune chose au Monde plus 
propre pour leur servir de regle, selon 
laquelle ils deussent former les 
ordonnances de leurs ouvrages, que ce seul 
patron de’homme; auquel ils ont remarqué 
une perpetuelle proportion gardée de Dieu 
mesme en la fabrique du corps; laquelle ils 
ont prinse en example, pour façonner à 
l’advenent les Architectures des Temples, 
Theatres, Amphitheatres, Palais, Tours, 
Vaiffeaux, & autres Instruments, soit de 
paix, soit de guerre, non seulement en leur 
entire, mais ausi en chascune des 
prencipales, Colomnes, Porteaux, 
Chapiteaux, Piedestaux, & autre members 
semblables.  Ainsi lit on, que le Temple de 
Salomon, ce grand ornament & miracle de 
la Republique Florissant des Iufs, a Esté 
compassé selon ceste mesme proportion: 
Et qui plus Est, que Dieu mesme auroit 
commandé au Patriarche Noë, en bastissant 
l’Arche, d’ensuivre la mesme regle.  Car 
tout ainsi que le corps de l’homme contient 
300 minutes en longueur; 50 en largeur; & 
30 en espesseur par le milieu de la poitrine: 
aussi pareillement l’ordonnance de l’Arce 
a esté 300 coudees de longueur, 50 de 
largeur; & 30 de hauter: de sorte qu’en l’un 
& l’autre la longeur est six fois autant, que 
la dix foit, que la profondeur.  Qui est une 
proportion, dont nous avons tousiours 
devant nos yeux les nombres, & les 
pouvens nous demonstrer clairement sur 
nos doigts, où nous avons coustume 
d’arrpendre les premieres leçons de 
l’Arithmetique naturelle.  Car la somme 
entiere, qui en est 10, estant multipliée par 
3, fait 30 pour l’espesseur; & par 5, fait 50 
pout la largeur; & multipliée par 10, avec 
le redouble de 3, fait 300 pour la longueur. 
Et à ces measures s’accorde aussi ce que 
plusiers graves Autheurs ecrivent  toucant 
la mesme matiere: comme entreautres, que 
Vitruve a rapporté la stature de l’homme à 
6 pied de mesure Geometrique; le pied à 
breadth and depth of the same body, the 
measurements which were so nicely 
observed by the greatest architects, ancient 
and modern, such that they could not have 
chosen anything in the world more correct 
to serve as rules according to which they 
ordered all the guiding principles of their 
work using only man as a guide; and to 
which, they, noted, God kept constantly in 
the design and construction of the human 
body, which they have as their prime 
example for their work on the architecture 
of temples, theatres, amphitheatres, 
palaces, towers, ships and other works, 
either tools of peace or tools of war, not 
only in their respective entireties, but also 
divided into their major components, 
columns, doorways, column headpieces 
and bases and other similar components. 
We also read of the Temple of Solomon, 
the great ornament2 and miracle of the 
Republic of the Jews in its flourishing, 
which was measured out with the same 
proportions: to which we add when same 
shining God commanded the Patriarch 
Noah to build the Ark by these same rules. 
The body of a man measures 300 minutes 
in length, 50 in width and 30 in depth at 
the chest.  Similarly the dimensions of the 
Ark were 300 cubits in length, 50 in width 
and 30 in height.  So that in the one and the 
other, the length is six times the width and 
10 times the depth.  This is a single 
proportion, one of which the numbers we 
have before our eyes,  & which we can 
clearly demonstrate on our fingers, on 
which depend the first lesson of Natural 
Arithemetic.  The complete sum, which is 
10, then multiplied by 3, is 30 for the 
depth, & by 5 gives 50 for the breadth, & 
multiplied by 10 and again by 3, gives 300 
for the length.  These measurements also 
accord with the many significant Authors 
who have written concerning this same 
matter: for example, Vitruvius reports that 
the stature of a man is 6 foot of the 
Geometrical measure; the foot is
2 In the sense of “that which adorns” rather than 
anything trivial.
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10 degrez; & chasque degree en 5 minutes; 
qui font 60 degrez, & 300 minutes, 
retirants justement aux trois cents coudees 
de l’Arche. Combien que je ne veuille pas 
m’arrester si precisement sur l’authorité de 
Vitruve, à luy donner six pieds 
Geometriques de longueur; ce m’est assez 
qu’on la puisse partir en six mesures 
egales.  Pline remarque ausse livre 7. 
chapitre 17,3 que ceste stature naturelle de 
l’homme bien proportionné s’accorde 
exactement à la mesure de sa propre 
brassee, de puis le bout des doigts de l’une 
mains jusques au bout de l’autre. En 
somme touts Philosophes ont fait tant 
d’estime de ceste mesure, & de la 
proportion de ce corps humain, & l’ont tant 
recerchée, les uns d’une façon, les aurtes 
de l’autre, que Pythagoras a osé nommer 
l’homme La Mesure de tout.  Quant à la 
proportion des Poids, il ne faut pas douter, 
qu’ell n’y soit aussi observée avec tout 
autant d’artifice, que les Nombres, ou les 
Mesures.  Ce qui est aisé à cognoistre, par 
ce que c’est l’homme seul de tout les 
animaux qui marche droit; de façon qu’il 
se tient tousiours en contrepoids & balance 
en tout actions, autrement il en seroit à tout 
moments incommode.  Car sa structure est 
telle, que touts ses members (exeptez les 
bras) à mesure qu’ils sont plus relevez de 
la terre, aussi sont ils plus pesants de plus 
en plus; si que les parties plus legeres & 
flus foibles soustiennent les autres plus 
pesantes & plus robustes: qui seroit chose 
contre Nature & du tout insupportable pour 
continuer longuement, en tant & en si 
diverses sortes de mouvements, comme on 
voit que ce corpes humain pratique., s’il 
n’estoit moderé au regard du Poids en tout 
3 17. Quod si homini spatium a vestigio ad verticen, 
id esse pansis manibus inter longissimos digitos 
observatum est, sicuti vires dextra parte maiores, 
quibusdam aequas utraque, aliquis laeva manu 
praecipuas, nec id  umquam in feminis; mares 
praestare pondere et defuncta viventibus corpora 
omnium animalium et dormentia vigilantibus; 
virorum cadavera supina fluitare, feminarum prona, 
velut pudori defunctarum parcente natura. 
(Mayhoff ed.; 1967)
10 degrees; & each degree in 5 minutes; 
which makes 60 degrees, & 300 minutes, 
which refers exactly to the 300 cubits of 
the Ark.  I am not sure to what extent we 
can rely exactly upon the authority of 
Vitruvius when he gives six feet 
geometrically as the length, but it suffices 
that the height may be divided equally into 
six.  Pliny says, in his book 7, chapter 13,3t 
that the natural height of a man is exactly 
proportional to the spread of his arms, 
from the fingers of the one hand to the 
other.  In sum, all philosophers have so 
esteemed this measure and the proportions 
of the human body, and have so deeply 
studied it in one way or another that 
Pythagoras even called man the measure of 
all things.  With regard to the 
proportionality of weight, it is not possible 
to doubt that this can also be observed with 
the all of the same degree of art as number 
and dimension.  We can easily take 
cognizance of this because man alone 
among all animals walks upright in such a 
way that there is always counterweight 
keeping him in balance in all actions, if not 
then he would be awkward in all 
movements.  This is because his structure 
is such that all his components (except the 
arms) become heavier the higher they are 
from the ground and so components that 
are lighter and more fragile support those 
that are more weighty and robust.  This 
would be contrary to Nature and could not 
be supported in the long run with all the 
diverse movements that we can see the 
human body being used for if the body did 
not regulate its weight from the top of the 
head to the bottom of the feet with a single, 
united and perfected art.
3t 17. We know that the height of a man is the same 
[length] as the span of his arms from fingertip to 
fingertip, likewise [we know] the right part to be 
the stronger, though sometimes the strength is 
equally distributed [between the hands]; 
occasionally the left is stronger, but never for 
women.  Men have the greater mass and the dead of 
all creatures are heavier than the living as the 
sleeping are than the waking.  The bodies of men 
float supine and those of women, prone; as if nature 
were sparing her modesty.
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ses parties depuis le sommet de la testes 
jusqu’aux plantes des pieds, d’un singulier 
& parfait artifice.  La declaration plus 
ample de ceste matiere appartient aux 
Anatomistes, qui font profession de 
declarer les particularitez de ceste noble 
structure: nous qui ne pretendons que d’en 
exposer seulement ce qui touche l’exercice 
des Armes, serons centents d’en declarer 
quelque chose en gros, notamment 
touchant les proportions exterieures, asin 
qu’il soit par cy après d’autant pluc facile à 
juger de la nature & portee de chascun des 
mouvements, qui en precedent.  Puis donc 
les mouvements se sont quelquesfois & 
plus souvent aves les bras & les mains, & 
autrefois avec les jambs & les pieds, nous 
demonstrerons presentement, que les 
homes sont capables d’exploiter leurs 
mouvemẽts necessaries & utils en plus 
grand nombre & plus aiseement & plus 
promptement, que ne font les autre 
animaux.  Don’t il sçavoir que c’est 
ordinaire & proprement l’office des bras & 
des mains d’executer le commandement de 
la volonté, en faisant les actions que 
l’utilité ou la necessité demande; & que les 
jambs & les pieds ne servent 
communement à autre chose, qu’à 
transporter & à tourner le corps, & à mettre 
les bras & mains en places, où la Volonté 
pretend que l’execution soit faite: & 
advantage, qu’il y a ceste difference, que 
les bras & les jambs sont specialement 
propres à faire les grands mouvements, 
ainsi que les pieds & les mains sont 
propres aux moindres: & comme les bras 
sont particulierement capables à executer 
ce où il faut de la force, ainsi les mains le 
sont d’autrepart pour travailler avec 
dexterité. Les Pieds, comme pilliers qui 
soustiennent les corps, sont devers les 
talons quasi immobiles, mais devers les 
orteils ils se meuvent assez promptement: 
de fort que par l’inegalite de ceste structure 
le corpse se peut affermir dessus, au 
moyen de l’un, comme il se peut 
d’autrepart remuer & tourner vistement & 
commodement de touts costez, au moyen 
de l’autre.  En l’un & en l’autre derechef il 
Complete explanation of these subjects is 
the office of the anatomists, whose 
profession it is to explain the particularities 
of this noble structure: we shall not pretend 
to show of this subject beyond what 
touches on the exercise of arms, but will be 
content to make some general declarations 
about it, touching on the external 
proportions, after which it will be easier to 
judge the nature and applicability of 
movements that come from it.  Sometimes 
the movements are made with everything 
& most frequently with the arms and 
hands, and at other times with the legs and 
feet, we will presently demonstrate that 
men are capable of using their necessary 
and useful movements in greater number 
and with greater ease and more swiftly that 
any of the other animals.
It is the normal and proper office of the 
arms and the hands to execute the 
commands of the will, and make possible 
the actions that utility or necessity demand; 
and the legs and the feet generally serve to 
do nothing other than to transport and steer 
the body and put the arms and hands in the 
place where the will intends the execution 
(of the tasks) to be done: also, their 
difference is that the arms and the legs are 
especially appropriate to make large 
movements whereas the feet and the hands 
are appropriate for smaller ones: and the 
arms are particularly capable of executing 
what must be done with force, likewise the 
hands, for their part, work with dexterity.
The feet, being pillars that support the 
body, are nearly immobile at the heels, but 
at the toes move with promptness and ease: 
strength comes from this inequality in the 
structure of the body from the one, while it 
is also gets the ability to move and direct 
itself easily and swiftly in every direction 
from  the other.  Both the one and the other 
provide 
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reçoit un grand soulas par la juste 
longueur, qui luy fournit un fondement 
stable & solide quand il s’arreste; & quand 
il marche, elle aide à le pousser & luy 
donner sa course.  Les Mains se meuvent 
fort agilement en touts leurs parties, & 
contienent en leur plus large la juste moitié 
de la largeur de visage, qui est le quart au 
regarde de la poitrine: la longueur en est 
deux fois autant: & estant la main fermée, 
le contour le poing sera le tiers du contour 
de la poitrine: en sorte qu’elle luy peut 
naturellement server d’escusson pour la 
defender, en la tenent devant, soit ouverte 
& esdendue, ou bien soit fermée.  C’est 
pouquoy Philo, autheur Iuif, a tres bien 
recontré à dire, qu’au au lieu de touts les 
ornaments & defenses natturelles des 
autres animaux , l’homme a este doüé de la 
Raison, comme Diretrice, & des Mains, 
comme Instruments pour executer  ce 
qu’elle veut: & que la Raison est la Main 
de l’Entendement; la main de la Raison 
c’est le Parole; et les Mains corporelles 
celles qui font l’execution de ce que la 
Parole commande.  Instruments, qui 
contiennent en eux toute le suffisance des 
autres, & qui par consequent les egalent et 
dignitité, voire les surmontent.  Pour 
laquelle cause il vient au Monde 
despourveu de toutes armes, tant offensive 
que defensive, & n’a que ce seul 
instrument de la main, au moyen duquel il 
se puisse prevaloir de toute.  Les autres 
animaus se defendant & offensent leurs 
contraires l’un avec les dents, l’autre avel 
les ongles, led pieds, les cornes; ainsi quil 
se voit és Elefans, Lions, Ours, Chevaux, 
Taureaux, Tigres, & autres bestes, à qui la 
Nature a departiassez chichement une 
seule espece d’Armes à chascune, pour la 
necessité de leur defense; mais à l’homme, 
qui en semble ester du tout privé, en 
recompense elle l’a doüé d’Entendement 
pour les cognoistre, d’Esprit pour les 
forger, & de Mains pour s’en aider de 
toutes & telles qu’il en puisse estre. 
mesme afin qu’il s’en peust aider avec plus 
d’avantage, elle luy a donné par special 
privilege de pouvir à mesme instant
great succor in the proper length, providing 
a stable and solid foundation when it is 
stopped and when it walks, they help by 
pushing and by providing direction.  The 
hands move with great agility in all their 
components, and at their greatest they 
measure one half the breadth of the face, or 
they are on quarter of the breast: which 
length is double that size: and the closed 
hand has a circumference of one third the 
circumference of the breast: this means 
that is can serve naturally as a shield for 
defense which held out forward, either 
open and extended or well closed.  
This is why Philo, the Jewish author, had 
had good opportunity to say that in lieu of 
the ornaments and natural defenses of 
other animals, man has been give reason, 
his guide, and the hands, which are 
instruments for the execution of what is 
willed: and reason is the hand of 
understanding; the hand of reason is 
speech; and the corporeal hands are what 
execute the commands of speech.  
These instruments, which contain all the 
capacity of the others, are in consequence 
their equal in dignity, even surpassing 
them.
For this reason, he arrives in this world 
deprived of any weapon, either offensive 
or defensive, and having only the 
instrument of the hand, through the use of 
which he has the power to prevail over all. 
The other animals defend themselves and 
attack their rivals, one with the teeth, 
another with claws, or hooves, or horns, all 
of which can be seen with elephants, lions, 
bears, horses, bulls, tigers and other beasts, 
which nature has meanly given one single 
type of armament for the necessities of 
their defense; but man who seems deprived 
of these, has been recompensed by her 
with understanding to know them, the soul/
mind to make them and the hands to help 
himself with the power of all of them.
Also, to help him with a greater advantage, 
she has given him by special privilege the 
power to simultaneously 
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fleschir les bras en arriere & les pieds en 
avant; chose impossible aux autres 
creatures: comme ausi pour la mesme, ou 
pour semblable cause, la situation naturelle 
des bras a esté placée en tel endroit, que les 
operations des mains fussent tousoirs sous 
le gouvernement de la veuë, pour en 
secourir & assister tant plus aisement le 
reste des members en leurs necessitez. 
Tout ainsi donc que les susdits Artistes, 
Architectes, Prespectivites, & autres ont 
tasché de prouver les fondements de leurs 
regles par les proportions du corpse de 
l’homme, ainsi avons nous pareillement 
tenu la mesme course, mais avec meilleure 
adresse, & avons trouvé à l’aide de ceste 
mesme buxole la vraye & proportionelle 
mesure de touts le Mouvements, de touts 
les Temps, & Distances, necessaires à 
observer en nostre Practique: comme il 
vous sera demonstré tout à l’instant en la 
declaration de nostre Circle; où les 
measures & proportions de l’homme sont 
appliqués à l’homme mesme, & aux 
mouvements qui l fait avec ses proper 
members, où ladite proportion se trouve, & 
sans laquelle il luy est impossible de faire 
la moindre action du Monde.  En 
practiquant donc cest Exercise, comme 
I’ay fait par plusieurs annees, en divers 
pays, & avec des grands amateurs; dont les 
uns tiroyent à la Françoise, les autres à 
l’Itallienne, & somme chascun à sa mode; 
j’ay veu qu’on s’accoustume par tout à des 
postures estrange, le corps plié en pluseirs 
courbures à pieds & jambs disioinctes hors 
de proportion naturelle, & en situations du 
tout repugnantes à la mode ordinaire qu’on 
tient en cheminant ou en demeurant ferme: 
de forte qu’au lieu de faire paroistre par 
ces mines quelque grand courage, on 
s’incommode & amoindrit on ses propres 
forces, plustost que d’en obrenir l’effect de 
l’intention pretendue.  Ce que considerant 
de pres, & sachant d’autrepart, que touts 
les Artes ensuivent la Nature, sans jamais y 
contrevenir, j’en ay prins occasion de 
vousoir conduire aussi nostre Exercise à la 
mesme Eschole de ceste Souveraine 
shoot the arms out to the rear and the feet 
to the front, something impossible for any 
other creature: also, because of the same, 
or a similar cause, the natural position of 
the arms are right in front, where the 
actions of the hands are constantly under 
the guidance of the vision, in order to 
secure and assist with ease the rest of the 
parts and their needs.  Similarly, all 
abovementioned Artists, Architects, 
Perspectivists, and others have tried to 
prove the foundations of their rules in 
terms of the proportions of the body of 
man, we have taken the same course in 
parallel (with them), but with more 
impressive results, and we have found with 
the aid of the same method the true and 
proportional measure of all Movements, all 
Times and Distances the observation of 
which is necessary for our practice: all of 
these we will show at the same time in the 
explanation of our Circle;  where the 
measure and proportions of man are 
applied to man himself, and to those 
movements he makes with his parts 
(limbs), in which those proportions are 
found, and without which it would be 
impossible to perform any action in the 
world.  In practicing this exercise, which I 
have done for many years, in different 
countries, and with great practitioners, 
some preferring the French manner, others 
the Italian, & each in his own fashion; all 
follow the custom of using strange 
postures, the body bends at several angles, 
the feet and legs separated from their 
natural proportion, and positioned in ways 
repugnant to the ordinary way of walking 
or standing: the effect of this is that instead 
of displaying great courage, they 
inconvenience themselves and reduce their 
own power, not gaining the benefits 
claimed for these actions.
Closely considering this, and knowing for 
its parts that all the arts follow Nature, 
without going against her, I have decided 
to conduct our exercise after that same 
school of the Sovereign 
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Maistresse des bonnes inventions.  En 
quoy j’ay remarqué premierement, que 
touts le Mesures & Instances à observer en 
ceste Pratique (qui sont les premiers 
fendements & l’appuy de touts les parties 
suivantes) precedent de la proportion du 
corpse de l’homme; comme aussi sans la 
mesme cognoissance elles ne sçauroyent 
estre deuemēt comprinses, non plus que 
d’estre pratiquées avec asseurance.  & 
qu’aussi le semblable en est il des Pas & 
Demarches ordinaries ou extraordinaires, 
que l’usage de l’Exercise & la varieté des 
occasions requierent.  Par où il appert, 
qu’il faut entrer si avant en ceste 
cognoissance de la proportion des 
memebres & parties du corps humain, 
qu’on puisse à tout le moins faire quelque 
raisonnable jugement de le portee de 
chascun movement, à proportion du 
member ou des members, d’ou il depend, 
& desquels il doit estre continué, fini, 
tourné, retourné, lasché, bandé, ou change 
en mille & mille manieres.  
Il faut donc sçavoir pour le premier, que 
les Philosophes attributent à ce 
Microcosme du corps humain diverses 
figures, don’t il sera parlé autrepart de la 
triangulaire, quadrangulaire, & pentagone. 
Presentement nous disons, qu’il est aussi 
rondo u circulaire en la figure de ses 
mouvements.  à qouys s’accorde le dire 
d’Hippocras Prince des Medecins, que le 
corps est un Cercle.  Ce qui se peut 
entendre tant au regard des actions & 
operations naturelles de ses parties 
interieurs & de leurs alterations subalterns, 
tellement reciproques & succedantes le 
unes aux autres, qu’il ne s’y trouve non 
plus de commencement ne de fin, qu’en la 
rondeur d’une circonference.  aussi se peut 
il rapporter à la figure de touts ses 
mouvements locaux, qui va tousiours en 
rond s’estendant depuis le centre de sa 
force jusqu’a l’extreme circonference de la 
foiblesse.  Or puis qu’il est donc presentent 
question, de vous faire voire la Mesure, qui 
soit convenable & proportionnée à la 
stature, situations, demarches, & 
Mistress of good inventions.  Just as I said 
at first, all measurements and positions that 
are observed in this practice (which are the 
basic fundamentals and on which all that 
follows is based) proceed from the 
proportions of the human body, and 
without knowledge of which those 
(measurements and positions) cannot be 
taken up and neither can they be practiced 
with certainty.  And also it is similar with 
Paces and Steps both ordinary and 
extraordinary, the use of which the 
Exercise and various occasions may 
require.  It is obvious therefore, that we 
must first acknowledge and understand the 
proportions of the parts and components of 
the human body, so that one may at least 
judge reasonable the range of each 
movement, in terms of the proportion of 
the component or components on which it 
depends, and as a consequence of which it 
can be continued, stopped, turned, 
returned, released, bent or changed in 
thousands and thousands of ways.
It is therefore first necessary to learn, that 
the philosophers attribute to this 
Microcosm, the human body, several 
figures, of some of which, the triangle, 
quadrilateral and pentagon, we will speak 
elsewhere.    For the present we will say 
that it is also round or circular in the figure 
of its motions.  This is agreed with by the 
dicta of Hippocrates Prince of Doctors, 
that the body is a circle.   This we should 
understand with regard to the natural 
actions and operations of the internal parts 
and their subordinate changes, 
reciprocating and succeeding one another, 
so that we cannot find either the beginning 
or the end, just like the circumference of a 
circle.  Likewise it can be compared to 
figure describing all the movements in 
their places, each being a circle extending 
from the centre of its strength to the 
circumference of its weakness.  Because 
the question will soon be asked, where do 
you get the Measure, that is convenient and 
proportional to the stature, situation, stride, 
and
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generallement à  tout les mouvements 
exterieurs de ce mesme corps; voicy la 
figure de nostre Cercle, que nous disons 
contenir toutes les susdites qualitez, & 
estre tire de la proper mesure & proportion 
du corps de l’homme.  Touts les 
Mathematiciens sçavent, que la figure 
circulaire ou ronde est la plus simple, la 
premiere, voire aussi la plus parfaite, la 
plus exellente, & la plus capable de toutes 
pour la defense; comme celle qui ne se 
laisse toucher en la surface, qu’en un seul 
point àla fois: dont une figure si 
accomplice ne devoit pas manquer à une 
corps si noble: auquel aussi elle peut estre 
demonstrée en diverses manieres; & 
principalement sur la longeur estendue; 
c’est à dire quand il se tient droit sur ses 
jambs, à pieds joincts, & les bras estendus 
droitement en haut, tellement que les 
coudes luy egalement le sommet to la teste. 
Car lors qu’il se tient en telle situation, soit 
debout conte un mur, soit estendue en la 
mesme sorte par terre, & qu’on luy mette 
l’une des branches d’un grand compass sur 
le nombril, & l’autre sur les orteils ou 
contre la plante des pieds, & qu’on en tire 
en rond une circonference, il en sourdra un 
Cercle; dont le Centre sera sur le nombril 
de la personne, le Diametre en sera comme 
la hauteur estendue, & la Circonference en 
touchera d’un costé la plant des pieds, & à 
l’opposite les bouts de ses doigts.  Si on y 
trouve de la faute, le corpsn’as pas esté 
exactement proportionné siuvant les regles 
de sa composition.  Or voilà mantenant le 
Cercle, duquel nous pretendone user en 
tout ce Livre pour l’adresse de nostre 
Exercise: lequel, d’autant qu’il est 
proportionné à la longeur estendue de 
l’homme, nous disons aussi estre 
proportionné à touts les mouuements qu’il 
sçauroit faire, avec bras & jambes, & avec 
tout le corps entier, ou avec chascune de 
ses parties.  On pourroit tirer encor 
d’autres Cercles de ceste proportion de 
l’homme en diverses manieres (comme en 
mettant le Centre sur les parties honteuses, 
& la Circonference au sommet de la teste 
& à la plante des pieds.) mais iceux ne 
in general to all the external movements of 
that same body; here is the figure of our 
circle, which we say contains all the above 
qualities, and is taken from the proper 
measurements and proportions of the body 
of man.  All mathematicians are aware that 
the circular or round figure is the most 
simple, the first and also the most perfect, 
the most excellent and the most useful of 
all figures for defense, because it does not 
make contact along a surface, but on a 
single point at a time: and it is a figure too 
accomplished to be lacking in a body so 
noble: and also it can be demonstrated 
there in several manners; principally 
through the fully extended length; which is 
to say standing upright with the legs and 
feet together and the arms extended 
directly upwards, in such a way that the 
elbows are equal with the top of the head.
When standing in this manner, either 
against a wall or stretched out the same 
way on the ground, and placing one arm of 
a great compass at the navel, and the other 
at the toes or otherwise the bottom of the 
feet, and drawing around a circumference, 
it creates a circle, the center of which is at 
the person’s navel, the diameter being the 
same at the height at full extension, and the 
circumference touching on the one side the 
bottom of the feet and on the other the tips 
of the fingers.  
If this is not the case, then the body not 
exactly in proportion according to the rules 
of its composition.
This is now the circle, which we propose 
to use throughout this book for the purpose 
of our exercise:  being in proportion to the 
extended length of a man, we also say that 
it is in proportion to all the movements he 
knows how to make, with arms and legs, 
and with the entire body, or with any one 
of its components.
One may draw many other circles based on 
the proportions of man in diverse ways 
(such as putting the center on the shameful 
parts4, and the circumference at the top of 
the head and the bottom of the feet) but 
4 Genitals
Peregrine Dace: Appendix A Page 87 25/03/2010
peuvent avoir la mesme suffisance, ne le 
convenance des mesures que nous 
cherchons presentement; à raison qu’ils 
n’ont pas de proportion avec les bras 
estendus, auxquels il appartient en cest 
Exercice d’executer la principale partie de 
la besoigne: pour laquelle cause, ensemble 
aussi pour quelques autres considerations, 
s’il est question de server icy de Cercle , il 
n’y faut advouer autre mesure de 
Diametre, que celle qui s’accorde 
exactement avec ceste longueur estendue.  
these do not have the same sufficiency, for 
the convenience of measure as that which 
we have presented; the reason is that they 
do not have the proportion of the extended 
arms, and it is quite apparent that these are 
needed for executing the great part of our 
exercise: for this reason, and for a variety 
of other considerations, it is a question of 
using this circle, I cannot advocate any 
Measure of the Diameter, than that which 
accords exactly with the length at full 
extension.
